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I. INTRODUCTION
There are few countries in the modern world where the mutual relationship
between foreign and domestic policies is more important than in the German
Democratic Republic (GDR). These policies have been governed by two important
and elusive requirements: the quest for legitimacy and the maintenance of regime
stability. Their importance to the East German leadership derives from the fact that
there are two Germanies, which are a product of the East-West confrontation. It is my
contention that these concerns have been the primary motivators in autonomous East
German pohcy decisions and political posture throughout the short history of the
GDR — that is, policies formulated in East Berlin and not Moscow. Thus, the purpose
of this paper is to analyze the East German Socialist Unity Party's (SED's) search for
legitimacy and stability — a search which functions as a major determinant of policy.
Unhke other communist states in Eastern Europe, the ruling SED regime is faced
with the need to attain legitimacy as a government and legitimacy as a new German
nation. How can a country which was conquered and thereafter occupied by the
Soviets, with its government set up along Marxist/Leninist lines and its foreign policy
historically controlled by Moscow, pretend to be a legitimate German state? In
Jonathon Steele's words, "In the Western world it was considered a bastard state, an
artificial satellite of the Soviet Union. "^ This is the paradox which has confronted the
leaders of the regime, and as this paper will show, has served as a major influence on
policymaking.
Long perceived as merely the Soviet Occupation Zone or the premier puppet
state of the USSR, East Germany has today become an increasingly influential nation
in the world and a politically viable actor in Central Europe. In 1973, this country
became the one hundred and thirty-third member of the United Nations; just five years
before, only thirteen countries officially viewed the GDR as a separate state. To be
sure, the Soviet Union remains the ultimate power overseeing the final policies of the
GDR; however, the political spectrum in which the SED leadership can function has
grown wider. The resulting changes and subtle increases in autonomy for the East
Jonathon Steele, Inside East Germany: The State That Came in From the Cold
(New York: Urizen Books, 1977), p. 3.
Germans have afTected domestic rule, intra-bloc foreign policy, and East-West
relations.
A. METHODOLOGY
To illustrate the importance of legitimacy and stability in East German
decisionmaking, different domestic and foreign policies are examined and their
relationship to legitimacy/stability concerns are analyzed.
Chapter 2 deals with the domestic policies of the SED in addressing its legitimacy
and stability concerns -- policies which demonstrate the tremendous energies and
resources expended in the attempt to attain even limited success in this regard. The
nature of East German political culture, political organization, socialization processes,
party recruitment, and social policy, reflect SED attempts at legitimation and
stabilization of the status quo. This influences not only the nature of policymaking in
the GDR, but determines the kind of society which now exists there.
The third chapter of this paper addresses the Sociahst Unity Party's use of
economics as a tool for gaining legitimacy. The East German economic heritage is
discussed in order to illustrate the problems which have confronted the GDR (and the
solutions which have been applied to correct them). Standards of living and levels of
personal consumption are compared to other similar nations in Eastern Europe in
order to illustrate that economics is utilized to build popular support for the regime.
Chapter 4 explores legitimacy and stability as motivations in East German
foreign relations. Four legitimacy/stability goals which motivate foreign policy
decisions are discussed -- that is, those legitimacy/stability goals which, if perceived as
vital by the SED leadership, could have possibly affected the final actions taken or
decisions adopted. These goals arc arranged in a matrix and rated as cither high or low
as motivators or factors in each situation. These legitimacy/stability (L/S) goals are:
1) National Identity Goals- Goals which would contribute to the overall perception
of a separate East German national heritage and culture.
2) Sovereignty Goals- Objectives which motivate policies that tend to illustrate theGDR as a separate German nation recounized in the international milieu as
such.
3) Ideological Goals- These are goals which illustrate the inherent "rightness" of
the East German social and political system.
4) Social Goals- Goals which affect those policies aimed at building popular
support through maintenance of consumer satisfaction and fuliUlmcnt of
popular expectations of an ever-rising standard of living.
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Also within this chapter, East German relationships with the Soviet Union, West
Germany, the Warsaw Pact, and the Third World are examined. First, the nature of
the GDR's position in each of these relationships is briefly explored and, second, the
L/S goals are applied to related issues. These issues are:
1) GDR-Soviet-West German Issues
Ostpolitik- The dispute between SED General Secretar>' Walter Ulbricht and the
Kremlin over detente with the West in the late 1960's and early I970's.
Abg^renzung- the policy of limiting Western influences -- a policy implemented
by Honeclter and the SED leadership after detente became a reality.
"Damage Limitation"- East German maintenance of close ties with the Federal
Republic of Germany after the deplovment of American intermediate nuclear
forces (INF) in Western Europe in 1983; actions which were contrary to Soviet
political posturing towards the West.
2) GDR-East European Issues
Czechoslovakia- J968- The policy and posture of the GDR in the period just
prior to the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and after the
Prague Spring" in 1968.
Poland- 1980-Sl- SED actions during the worker strikes and crisis in Poland
beginning in August 1980.
3) The GDR and the Third World- The nature of the extensive East German
involvement in various Third World countries -- countries both inside and
outside of the "socialist camp."
The legitimacy/stabiUty goals active in these issues are determined to be major
influencing factors in East German foreign policy.
The fifth chapter outlines the United States policies in Central Europe and their
relationship with the attainment of East German legitimacy and stability goals. A
history of American interests in East Germany is briefly examined, and those which
remain important today are analyzed. This is accomplished by comparing the three
major American national interests (world order interests, economic interests, and
ideological interests) to the East German L/S goals in order to illustrate the constraints
which the United States must face in developing policies in Central Europe. Lastly,
policy options are posited using this paradigm.
B. LEGITIMACY AND STABILITY DEFINED
The Dictionary of Political Thought defines legitimacy as:
The process whereby power gains acceptance for itself in the eyes of those who
are governed by it, by generating a beUef in its legitimacy .... in communist
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states leizitimation tends to persist (despite the ofTicial view that, after the
revolution, it will no longer be necessar}), .buL,has the novel character of issuing
directly from the state, in^'the form of doctrine.^
Therefore, in the East German sense, legitimacy can be defined in terms of the
perception (by the populace) of credibility: credibility as a government, a social
system, and a nation. Given the circumstances of the creation of the GDR, the
Western concept of legality (emanating from popular mandate and considered an
important aspect of legitimacy) is discarded in a state such as East Germany in favor
of acquiescence and partial support by the populace. In the GDR, legitimacy can be
claimed by the leadership, but in reality it can only truly exist if granted (perceived) by
the East German people. It is identified and hence realized in many ways -- through
popular support and compliance, the realization of a sense of national sovereignty and
pride by the people, increased East German patriotism (as different from an overall
German patriotism), and, above all, the tacit acceptance of the SED regime by the East
German population.
Legitimacy is important in the German Democratic Republic for two major
reasons. First, legitimacy assists in bolstering the domestic political stability of the
ruling party — stability which is derived from domestically perceiv-ed legitimacy. This is
accompUshed by creating a sense of confidence not only in the polity itself, but also in
the ideology which is the polity's foundation. Second, legitimacy aids in attaining
\hosQ foreign policy goals which contribute to the above. Given the circumstances of
the creation and development of the GDR, a legitimate government (in the East
German sense) possesses greater flexibility in realizing political, social, and economic
success than a government which appears to be based solely on coercion.
Regime stability, on the other hand, is the maintenance of political power and
control by the Marxist/ Leninist government in East Berlin. Stephen Bowers considers
stability:
... a function of numerous factors: the extent to which citizen expectations are
satisfied, popular identification with the svstem. and acceptance ol" governmental
legitimacy are but a few of the most obvious. Compliance with, laws is yet
another component in the catalogue of indicators of regime stability.
Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (New York: Harper and Row
Publishers; 1982), pp ^64-265.
Stephen R. Bowers. "Law and Lawlessness in a Socialist Socictv: The Potential
Impact oi Crime in East Germany," World AJfairs 145 (Fall 1982), p. 152.
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Stability is also evident in the absence of widespread dissent and threats of
counterrevolution, continued economic viability, total control over all aspects of
society, and recently, at least partial support for the political structure on the part of
the population.
While stability is the ultimate objective for which legitimacy is sought and
created, there remains a mutual relationship between both factors. In other words, the
long term goal is always stability; although some periodic systemic instability may be
required to "fine-tune" or eliminate dangerous deviation (i.e., the Berlin Wall or
massive economic reform). Because of the mutual influence oC legitimacy and stability,
they will be treated throughout this analysis as a single factor unless dilTerences are
emphasized.
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II. THE DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
East German domestic policies arc dominated by the necessity to maintain
regime stability and build legitimacy for the State and the Party. Consequently, the
regime places great importance on the transformation of the society in order to realize
these goals. It seems that every aspect of the social system has been included, with
varying success, in the creation of the "perfect state."
Political culture assists in addressing the legitimacy problem through the
establishment of an ideological foundation and political structure in order to create
support for the socialist regime. Political recruitment policies emphasize incorporation
of talent and expertise to build popular advocacy through efficiency and results. The
socialization process seeks to create a "new German" in the GDR to address the
legitimacy deficit through education, social structure, and propaganda. Lastly, overall
social policies attempt to satisfy as many of the wants and needs of the population as
is politically and ideologically feasible.
B. POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
Peter Merkl defines political culture as:
. . . internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population.
People are inducted into it just as thcv are socialized into nonpolitical roles and
social systems .... The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution
of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the
nation.
This orientation toward the political structure of the nation enables, to a certain
degree, some identification with the system by the average citizen, i.e., where the
system has been and where it is going. In this respect, one of the most important ways
to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the governed is to put forth a logical and explainable
ideology. Ideology provides a frame of reference to lend continuity and purpose to
that political structure which is attempting to administer and control the nation. In
this regard, the official ideology of the German Democratic Republic is based on the
Peter Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics (New York: Molt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1970), p. i49.
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Soviet pattern (Marxism/ Leninism). Formulated from the writings of Marx, Lenin,
and to some extent, Engels, Marxism/Leninism posits basic assumptions about man --
his beliefs, history, and the universe per se. The aspects of class struggle and
proletarian revolution, the overview of historical development and dialectic, and
Lenin's dictatorship of the proletariat are all integral parts of the political basis for rule
of the Socialist Unity Party in East Germany. Thus, the foundation for communist
rule in the GDR is predicated upon the "science" of Marxism/Leninism, and
consequently, utilized by the regime to instill a sense of correctness and continuity to
the SED system.
The development of the political culture of East Germany is divided into three
periods by John Starrels and Anita Mallinckrodt.^
1) The "Anti- Fascist Democratic Revolution" (1945-49).
2) Transition to the Construction of Socialism (1950-61).
3) Developing Socialism (1962-present).
1945-1949- The first phase consisted of anti-fascist programs to de-nazify the Soviet
Occupation Zones. The period between 1945 and 1949 was the formative stage of the
current political structure in the GDR. The Soviets forced the fusion of the
Communist and Social Democratic parties into the Sozialistiche Einheitspartei
Deuischland (SED). This became the highly centralized communist party which is
evident elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Other parties were allowed to exist, but they
became part of the National Front and directly controlled by the SED. The fusion of
the Communists and Social Democrats, as well as the legally sanctioned existence of
other so-called "opposition" parties, occurred partly to give the illusion of greater
participation and plurality in the face of the stark absence of legitimacy evident in the
postwar Soviet Occupation Zone. The fact that the other parties remain in existence
today exemplifies the continuing need for the regime to gain credibility as a governing
structure.
^John M. Starrels and Anita M. Mallinckrodt, Politics in the German Democratic
Republic (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 27-31.
.^For a detailed work on the coalition of the SPD and KPD as well as the
creation of the National Front, sec J. P. Ncttl, The F.astern Zone and Soviet Policy in
Germany- 1945-1950 (New York: Octagon Boob, 1977).
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This period was also the time of a declared "German road to socialism." Private
property was largely abolished between 1946 and 1949, and major reforms in education
and justice were undertaken to create a genuinely new society. The GDR was formally
declared a state in 1949.
1950-1961- The second phase occurred during the 1950's. East Germany's political
apparatus was preoccupied with suppressing both internal and external political
opposition as illustrated in the June 1953 uprising in Berlin.
In general, this stage was characterized bv the so-called class strucgle within and
by a continuous reorganization in almost all areas of the party, slate, economy,
and society. Not only did the SED leadership systematicallv try to place its loyal
cadres in all these areas; it also methodically destroyed the remnants of private
property and the older structures in commerce .... tlie psychological
achievements of of the SED in these years were relatively limited.'
The decade of the 1950's was a period of massive emigration to the West and
subsequent loss of skilled workers and intellectuals. During this time the party relied
largely upon coercion to maintain power and public acquiescence — coercion in the
form of incarceration, forced labor, or control over job placement. As West Germany
applied diplomatic and economic pressure throughout the world to isolate the GDR,
the East German population began to maintain a wait-and-see attitude within this
oppressive environment.^ However, this somewhat neutral stance was quickly altered
when forced collectivization was introduced in 1961, reawakening the people to the
reality of the socialist system in which they lived.
1962-Present- Thus, the third and present stage of development began. Until the
middle 1960's the regime had not been capable of providing an appreciable semblance
of social and economic stability to foster a better atmosphere of popular consensus on
major societal issues. The primary factor which dramatically altered the position of the
SED leadership was the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. As a result, the rapid flow
of emigrants to the West was curtailed and the East German society was forced to
^Peter Ludz, The GDR From the 60's to the 70's (New York: AMS Press Inc.,
1974), pp. 5-6.
This period was one of the most threatenins for the SED rccime because of the
massive emigration and economic/political isolation of the GDR. As long as the door
to the West", was at least partially open, the population was not forced to accept in
their own minds the permanence "of the situation. To them, reunification remained a
real possibility for the near future.
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accept the realities of the political, as well as economic, situation. Armed with this
new sense of stability, the SED began to implement changes in its policies which
reflected a growth in regime confidence and a sense of security. Persuasion began to
slowly replace coercion as an instrument of control because as the human stream to
the West was dammed, the most blatant evidence of the regime's illegitimacy and
instability was eliminated. The regime could then turn to building a stronger economy
and socialist society. Consequently, new flexibility appeared as seen in the
introduction of the New Economic System (NES) in 1963.^
Today, the political structure itself is a close replica of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU). As in the USSR, the government consists of the Party and
the State; the Party makes all major policy decisions and the State is tasked with
carrying out these policies. The Politburo sits at the apex of the structure with
twenty-five members, of which eight are alternates. These members represent the Party
hierarchy, as well as government and mass organizations; they also are the real sources
of poUtical power in the GDR.
Below the Politburo, eflcctive policymaking takes place in the Council of
Ministers Presidium; the Council of Ministers itself; the Secretariat of the Central
Committee; and the Central Committee (in order of iniportance). Many high Party
officials also hold corresponding positions in the State hierarchy, thus reinforcing the
pervasive influence of the SED.
More specifically, the functions of the Party can be divided into higher and lower
strata. In the lower areas of Basic Party Organizations {DPO's), counties (Bezirke),
and districts (Kreis) there are five functions:
1) Personnel- the selecting and training of potential leaders and administrators for
the Party.
2) Socialization- inculcating the basic values and knowledge which all citizens
require to function in the new socialist system.
3) Monitoring- the constant overseeing of the performance of institutions.
4) Coordination- limiting the ubiquitous conflicts resulting from the vertical
planning of the system.
This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. To obtain an overall view of
the NES see J. Wilczynski. The Economics of Socialism (London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1977); and Vlichael Keren, "Tlie Rise and ["all of the New Economic
System," in I he German Democratic Republic: A Developed Socialist Society, ed. Lyman
LI. Legters (Boulder: Westvicw Press, 1978), pp. 61-84.
^^C. Bradlev Scharf, Politics and Change in East Germany: An Evaluation of a
Socialist Democracy (Boulder: Wcstview Press," 1984), pp. 47-51.
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5) Intervention- fixing the malfunctions, whether they are political, administrative,
or technical in nature.
The higher, or national, level of the Party carries out these five functions in addition to
goal-setting. For the benefit of this paper, the most important functions of these five
in building and maintaining regime legitimacy and stability are personnel selection and
political socialization.
C. PARTY RECRUITMENT
The process of SED political recruitment is a vehicle for creating perceptions of
popular participation and representation while simultaneously providing the necessary
incentives to attract the needed talent into the governing structure. This process tends
to coopt those who might under different circumstances become dissenters or at least
non-actors in the creation of the "new socialist man". However, cooptation aside, the
Party requires (and utilizes) only a few decisionmakers or power wielders.
If personnel selection is successful, then regime stability is maintained and a
perception of legitimacy for the political system becomes more evident in the people.
In addition, the acquisition of fresh personnel into the ruling party of the GDR assists
in the maintenance of a stable and credible political structure. The Socialist Unity
Party attempts to draw support from all facets of society in its recruiting of new
members. This aids in creating popular support and, consequently, the recruiting
process seems to be rather broad-based. The SED has a membership considerably
larger than most communist countries in Eastern Europe as a percentage of its total
population. In 1981 SED membership was 2,172,110 (including the candidate
members) from a population of approximately 16.5 million. '' This large SED structure
reflects the importance placed on Party membership by the people because all
important avenues of education and work arc opened by way of the Party. However,
the mass membership of the East German Party is not a catch-all for opportunists or
mediocre talent. It is in the SED's best interest to recruit from society those who are
most skilled and educated in order to ensure that qualified political and administrative
personnel will be available to fill the vacancies which will occur: after all, the more




The young person who seems promising to the Party is usually identified by the
basic party organization (BPO). More than 50 percent of SED recruits have graduated
from an institution of higher learning or technical college. These young people are
selected on the basis of academic achievement, proven community service, an untainted
political past, and at least partial or temporary membership in the communist youth
organization. Often, written recommendations from SED officials are required. This
type of SED candidate resembles those in the United States who may be applying for
appointments to well-known graduate schools. Other avenues into the SED are open
to the upper ranks of the youth organization, the military, and industrial/labor unions.
After selection, there is a mandatory one year probation period or candidacy before
final acceptance is granted. These rather stringent requirements illustrate that there are
many East Germans willing to join the Social Unity Party; a fact which is important
because it places the East German communist membership in a more prestigious
position than in other communist parties in Eastern Europe.
Although the class structure of the society is maintained in proportion,
membership seems to be moving towards an elite party or pseudo-aristocracy. One
reason for this, besides the selection process discussed above, is the predominance of
educated, technical recruits. This creates on the one hand an acceptance of a
"meritocratic" system which could attract younger, more talented individuals, while on
the other hand, it damages the Marxist concept of the classless society, at least in the
eyes of the average East German. Hence the recruiting process encourages regime
stability by fostering a supply of talented people, but because of the ideology involved,
legitimacy of the system may suffer in the long run. This is one of those rare times
where the two aspects of legitimacy and stability may not be mutually helpful.
Nonetheless, the process of selection discussed above has helped to create a new and
influential element of leadership within the ruling structure in East Germany.
One in six people over the age of eighteen belongs to the Party. However, the
average SED member wields very little power and possesses little or no voice in
policymaking. They do provide the illusion of popular participation and serve as a Unk
Eugene K. Keefe, F.ast Germany. A Country Study (Washington, D.C.:
American University, 1982), p. 81.
East European and Soviet Data Handbook- Political, Social, and Developmental
Indicators: 1945-1975 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), Table B-5.
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to the masses; however, it is the party cadres who are the sources of real political
power. These party members in particular are the ones who assure that the system
performs as it should and arc responsible for carrying out those functions of the Party
discussed previously. Although total membership is supposed to reflect the rough
proportions of class structure (namely the preponderence of working class members),
the cadre membership is becoming more and more educated and technical. The greater
proportion of new party members with advanced formal education, technical expertise,
and experience in engineering, science, economics, and mathematics reflects the new
social stratum in the GDR called the "technical intelligensia." In Thomas Baylis'
words:
The technical intellieensia in the German Democratic Republic (DDR) is an
example of an infrequent but fascinating social phenomenon: a stratum
consciously created bv a political regime as an instrument for furthering its goals
for remaking society.
The creation of a "technocracy" of highly rewarded and apparently
status-conscious people was indeed a process carried out by the East German political
leaders with "malice of forethought." They realized that Marx and Lenin provided a
set of codes to be followed generally, but that the realities and logic of a modern and
complex industrial society demanded technical expertise. This new technocratic
stratum was a direct result of the need to rebuild the East German economy and
infrastructure following World War II. In addition, the large-scale emigration of the
I940's and 1950's produced a severe shortage of trained and experienced personnel.
Therefore, the creation of the technical intelligensia was a necessity for obtaining the
material goals of the Party, which in turn served to build popular confidence in the
government. In part, the New Economic System was a result of this new entity
gaining inroads into the governing apparatus. Their ability to go around the system,
their aura of flexibiUty, and their recognition of the need for economic pragmatism in
the GDR have proven an attraction for popular support:
In the earlv postwar davs the SED had relied for moral authority on its claim to
be heir to German revofutionarv traditions and on its sacrifices under Hitler. But
Thomas A. Baylis. The Technical Intelligensia and the East German Elite
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. ix.
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for large sections of the population, who.were still infected with nationalism, the
SED's'attempts at self-legitimation were irrelevent or even counter-productive . .
. . With the iSES. and the appointment of economic experts the SED could claim
the legitimacy which comes from successful sovernment performance especiallv in
the ec^onomy. The use of experts svmbolizecl the shift in the SED's ideology and
propaganda' towards modernization and rationalization. Jt was also a way of
mtegrating the new professional elites into the government.
However, does this new intelUgensia possess real poHtical power? Thomas Baylis
suggests:
While the technocratic phenomenon in itself suggests no unambiguous
directions for policy, it imposes limitations on the means bv which specuilists
may achieve political influence. The hostility, of the (ideal) technocrat to politics
would appear in principle to be seriously disabling. Unwilling to bend to the
customary tactics of political struggle (and here it does not matter whether the
setting, .is' democratic or authoritarian), he all but deprives himself of the
gossibilitv of directly achieving power„.IIis only plausible route to influence
ecomes that of cooptation from above.
Therefore, the technical elite in the GDR wield political power only in that they can
influence the execution of policy. Through cooptation, the "technical intelligensia" are
utilized by the regime and maintained within its control.
It is then evident that recruitment into the party, government, and administrative
structures is carried out in a well-planned method with the needs of the socialist polity
always in mind. The cooptation and utilization of the more talented personnel in
society contributes to less dissent, better results, and party prestige. As these
technocrats rise in the political hierarchy, they will come to constitute greater
proportions of the one percent of the population who belong to the political elite.
D. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
There have been fundamental societal changes in the GDR since World War II.
To bring about a more integrated and, consequently, more acquiescent society, the
regime has focused its attention on eliminating the "bourgeois" nature within the GDR.
This socialization process has been carried out through youth policy (education and
organizations), propaganda, emphasis on collectivism, and officially sanctioned
nationalism (national identity). All of these are evident in Walter Ulbricht's 1958 "ten
commandments of socialist morality":
Jonathon Steele, Inside East Germany, p. 123.
Thomas Baylis, The Technical IntelUgensia, pp. 210-21 \.
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1) Thou shall honor the international solidarity of the working class and the
proletariat and strive for iriendship and aUiance between all socialist countries.
2) Thou shalt love thy fatherland and alu^ays be prepared to defend the Workers'
and Peasants' State with all thy strength.
3) Thou shalt help to eliminate exploitation of man by man.
4) Thou shalt strive to perform good socialism, for it leads to a better life for all
members of the working class.
5) Thou shalt act in a spirit of comradely cooperation and mutual help in the
construction of socialism and respect the collective and take heart its criticism.
6) Thou shalt protect and help to multiply the people's property.
7) Thou shalt strive to improve thv productivity, to be thrifty and frugal and to
strengthen sociahst discipline of Tabor.
8) Thou shalt raise thy children in the spirit of socialisrn and peace and help them
to become well-educated, healthy and strong persons in body and mind.
9) Thou shalt live cleanly and decently and respect thy family.
10) Thou shalt practice and observe solidarity with those peoples of the world
fighting for .-their freedom and strug'gling to defend their national
iiidepehdence.
1. Youth Policies
All societies are concerned that their youth should inherit and promulgate the
collective norms and values of their society from one generation to another. This is no
different in the GDR; the only change is the creation by the SED of new socialist
values (i.e., collectivism, international prolctarianism, and working for the good of
socialism and not the individual) to subsitute for the old ones (i.e., laboring for oneself
and family, beUef in individual freedoms and "classic" democracy, and support for
individual freedom). Indeed, the concern in a revolutionary communist society for the
transformation of cultural values, orientations, and ethics to fit socialist criteria is
directly related to the quest for stability and legitimacy by the Party. Although this
metamorphosis may lead to a temporary loss of stability (as in Stalin's Purges), the
final goal, if attained, will be increased systemic stability.
The impetus for change and continuity of the new system rests on the
shoulders of the youth. The role of the younger people in the GDR, as in other
communist societies, is often explained or justified in terms of ideology: "In particular,
this ideological significance demands on the part of youth the development of certain
personal characteristics which arc deemed vital if youth are to fulfill their present and
I 7
The Soviet Union adopted a close copy of this in 1961. John Dornberg, The
Other Germany (New York: .Vlacmillan Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 228-229.
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future responsibilities."^^ These responsibilities include the cultivation of the "socialist
personality", an internationalist attitude, a socialist work ethic, proper behavior,
relevent knowledge, and love for the fatherland.
Political socialization begins in early childhood in East Germany and is
difficult to carry out in the family environment:
A major socialization impact usually occurs in the earlv vears of life within the
family context. Children acquire politically relevent vafue's by eeneralizins from
their experience in family authority relations and in imitatina me behavior and
attitudes
.
of their parents toward the wider world. Obviously, parental
participation in this process is, for the most part, unconscious or latent. In a
society whose leaders are intent on promoting social chanse socialization in the
family-whether conscious or unconscious-can^be a serious'obstacle, especially in
those cases, gWhere a modernizing poUtical regime confronts a very traditional
population.
As a result, socialist values are stressed throughout the educational program;
all academic instruction, especially science and mathematics, is heavily laced with
ideology. Curriculum content is monitored by the government to ensure proper
philosophical and ideological values and orientation. Therefore, the citizens' first
encounter with the State and its quest for stability and legitimacy begins in the
educational institutions and remains with them throughout their scholastic years under
the total control of the governing structure.
The educational system begins with preschool kindergarten for ages three to
six. The standard ten-year polytechnical education which follows is compulsory for
ever^'one between the ages of six and sixteen. Higher education then splits into two
different directions: general education as preparation for university training or
vocational training. For the duration of the educational experience, socialization is
intense and often more time-consuming in certain classes than is academic work.
More specifically, the first of three stages is the primary stage (grades one
through four), which introduces the young children to the fundamentals of good
citizenship in the socialist sense, in addition to the general education requirements of
mathematics, literature, etc. The second stage takes place in grades four to six where
the student is given a more intensive political and ideological foundation. This serves
to assist the student in "correctly" assessing his or her role and position in the socialist
^^Stephcn R. Bowers, "Youth Policies in the GDR", Problems of Communism
(March-April 1978), p. 78.
C. Bradley Scharf, Politics and Change in East Germany, p. 126.
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state as well as the external world. The connection between education and work is
emphasized along with the importance of a "socialist attitude" towards labor. The fmal
stage incorporates the last four grades of the general polytechnical schooling. Besides
weekly hands-on training in industrial factories and workplaces, and continued political
training, science and mathematics are gradually given a prominent role in the
curriculum. This is a result of the regime's need for technically-oriented individuals as
discussed earlier.'^
2. Propaganda
Besides childhood education, another prominent form of socialization takes
advantage of the pervasiveness of newspaper readers and owners of televisions and
radios in East Germany. This creates a special niche for the public media and
propagandists. Peter Grothe considers:
. . . the purpose of Communist propaganda in East Germany, as, indeed, in
every Communist country, is clear: to cliange the verv consciousness of man.
The purpose is to atomize the individual thinking of r7.000,000 East Germans
and to grind them into one species- homo sovieticus- "The New Man". "The
New Man" will parrot slogans when they should be parroted: he will do what
should be done; he will say what should" be,, said; he will think what should be
thought; and he will feel what should be felt."
What better way to ensure a stable political atmosphere than to control the
informational inputs (in order to manipulate the output) of a people's thoughts?
There are thirty-eight daily newspapers, five hundred monthly magazines and
weekly papers, two color television stations, and numerous radio stations in the
GDR.^^ Therefore, the SED possesses multiple outlets for political propaganda and
agitation in order to inculcate socialist ideas and even simple semantics into the
population. F'or instance, even avowed enemies of the regime in the GDR have easily
fallen into the routine of using some typical East German words such as sozialisiiches
Lager (the socialist camp of the communist states) or other socialist words such as
"bourgeois" or "imperialism." l"he population repeatedly hears and remembers these
semantics of the "language" of socialism.
"For an excellent overview of the relationship between education and
socialization, as well as political recruitment, see Thomas A. Baylis, The Technical
Intelligensia and the East German Elite.
Peter Grothe, To Win the Minds of Men: The Slorv of the Communist
Propaganda in East Germany (Palo Alto: Pacific Books, 1958), p. 38.
C. Bradley Scharf, Politics and Change in East Germany, pp. 127-128.
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The ofTices which control propaganda and agitation belong to the SED
organizational structure rather than the state bureaucracy."^ This illustrates the
importance the SED places on having the media controlled by the Party and not the
State. Although this internal control of GDR media is virtually universal, external
programming from the Federal Republic of Germany is widely received throughout the
country as what GDR experts in 1984 described as "long term poison in small doses"
and "ideological sabotage against true socialism in the GDR."'^'* However, it would be
almost impossible for the average citizen not to be affected in some way by the
communist controlled information around him. Therefore, propaganda does serve to
color his attitudes and values in a useful way (from the perspective of the regime). In
this regard, the propaganda organs of the SED attempt to create a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Given the amount of rhetoric, deception, falsification, and non-reporting in
the official SED controlled media, even partial absorption could create a population
which is skeptical of Western media and information.
The emphasis placed upon Agitprop in the GDR is evidenced in the large
numbers of personnel involved in ideological work. The elite structures within the
Agitprop apparatus demonstrate the importance of propaganda in legitimizing SED
rule. Thomas Baylis has identified four groups of what he terms as "ideological
eUtes:"^^
1) Ideological administrators are the first group, and includes those individuals
who head Agitprop within the Partv apparatus. For example, the Central
Cominittee Secretary for Agitation and Propaganda, Joachim Herrmann, would
be considered a member oTthis group. In addition, head administrators in the
lower Agitprop organizations belong to this category.
2) Education and Culture OfTicials make tip the second group. Partv functionaries
such as the Secretary of the Central Committee for Science and Culture hold
important positions in ideological responsibilities.
3) Teachers, scholars, administrators, and political officers who interpret and are
involved in the study or teaching of socialist thought arc the third group. Also
in this category are persons involved in related fields such as philos'ophv, social,
sciences, economics, and law. They are important (in Agitprop) because of
their inllucnce on the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism to their students and
The importance of the agitation and propaganda apparatuses (Agitprop) was
expanded with the accession to" power ol' Honeckcr in i971 as evidenced bv the
promotions of Werner Krolikowski and Werner Lamberz to the Politburo; both' were
formerly involved in the agitprop apparatus. Sec Eugene Keefe, ed., East Germany, p.
Io2.
^^Hamburg DPA, 31 August 1984, in FBIS (Eastern Europe), 5 September 1984,
p. E 2.
See Thomas Bavlis, "Agitprop as a Vocation: The East German Ideological
Elite," Polity (Fall 1985).^
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colleasues. For example, heads of the ideological training academies such as
the "ICarl Marx" Academy are included in this group.
4) Lastly, the media specialists who are responsible for disseminating information
to the public constitute the fourth group. Editors, publishers, newscasters, and
film producers who are connected to {and controlled by) the SED are members
of this group.
According to Baylis, the ideological elite in the GDR may enjoy more upward mobility
in their careers than do their counterparts in the Soviet Union. He identifies the most
important reason as:
. . . undoubtedly the DDR leadership's awareness of being on the "ideological
front lines" of the" Cold War. Its highly educated citizenry is confronted witlfthe
blandishments of West German television and an unceasing How of telephone
calls and visits from German-speaking carriers of Bourgeois ideas and values ....
The threat to popular "consciousness" they pose aives new urgency to the
regime's continuing preoccupation with fortifying its ideological defenses ....
Ideology, in other ^vords, is intimately linked \vitn the question of legitimacy in
the eyes" of the DDR's leaders, including those who themselves have liftlc interest
in the niceties of formal doctrine . . . ."the DDR's ideological specialists seek to
legitimize the regime not only in the eyes of the East German qtizeniw, but of
the Soviet Union" and, perhaps, even the' DDR leaders themselves.^
Agitation and propaganda is thus a pivotal aspect of SED attempts at domestic
legitimacy.
3. Collectivism
Another important means of political socialization consciously used by the
leaders in the GDR is the constant emphasis on collectivism or corporatism. The more
organic and interdependent the culture can be made, the less chance for independent
and hence dissenting thought. The importance of the goals of the new socialist system
in East Germany have been molded into a joint undertaking for its people by the SED
with the hope of attaining a collective consciousness as a means for maintaining
stability.
During the first decade and a half after World War II, the communist rule in
East Germany concentrated on elimination of the hostile elements of society — that is,
hostile to the regime and socialism. This included Nazis, small and large entrcpcncurs,
"real" Social Democrats, and later, labor unions and would-be emigrants. This
illustrated the complete lack of unity in the nation, especially after the June 1953
uprising (Chapter 3 discusses this in more detail). The signal event of the construction




compel its population into a position of more control. The 1963 Party Program
outlined the prediction that a "comprehensive building of socialism" would result from
the greater unity of the people."-^"^ Therefore, the task taken on by the SED was to
bring together the diverse interests and attitudes of the difTerent segments within the
society in a unity of mind and effort. This was used to elucidate the spirit of
corporatism and collectivism which has been a continuous theme throughout the last
twenty-five years and used by Party theorists to weld all citizens into a collective social
organism.
The Party considers itself the vanguard of a society consisting of working
people by working people for working people. However, in order for the society to
work for the benefit of the existing political structure, the individual must be taken out
of the picture and replaced by the collective man. The "I" must be changed to a
collective "we." Because collectivism relates to the entire lifestyle of individuals, the
SED attempts to create "public virtues" which have proven somewhat successful in
bringing a corporate nature into the society. A social ethic of joint cooperation
among individuals has been created and permeates all aspects of East German life.
Much of this socialization process is a result of the introduction of educational theories
into the Soviet Occupation Zone by the Soviet Union. In the GDR this concept of
collectivism is called Bildung wid Erziehung and has been applied to every form of
social interaction and existence. The Party expects that this entire process will produce
a consensus of joint sacrifice and contribution for the good of the whole at the expense
of the individual.
There are factory collectives, agricultural collectives, literary collectives, and
even sports collectives to help in bringing about a corporate consciousness in the
citizenry. These are not only collective in organization, but also operation; for,
although (in communism) collectivism is first and foremost economic in character, the
socialization aspects of collectivism are possibly just as important in the East German
case. Mass organizations are also an integral part of this process. These include the
Free German Trade Union with approximately 96 percent of all workers.' There are
^"^This was adopted at the Sixth SED Congress of January 1963. one of many
important political statements which followed in the aftermath of the Berlin Wall.
See Starrels and Mallinckrodt, Politics in the GDR, p. 36.
Eugene Keefc, ed.. East Germany, p. 92.
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also organizations for youth (Free German Youth) and for women (Democratic
Women's League).
Continued militarization of East German society is also motivated by the
SED's desire to collectivize further the populace. This militarization takes the forms of
parades, massive troop movements, war toys in kindergartens, hand-grenade practice
for youngsters, a compulsory and almost universal draft, civil defense exercises, and the
official praising of military virtues. In addition, there are approximately 167,000 East
German and 420,000 Soviet troops stationed throughout the GDR. Added to this the
security police, border units, and militia units, the total number of men under arms in
East Germany well exceeds 1,200,000, creating the most dense concentration of military
troops in the world. ^^ This amounts to approximately 1 1 soldiers per square
kilometer. ^^
The military itself serves a socialization function:
On the internal scene, it is important as a vehicle for socializing the country's
youth. It teaches discipline, works activelv to counter West'ern ideas and
influence, and. to the degree possible, inculcates in.;he minds of its recruits
acceptance of (if not enthu^siastic loyalty to) the GDR.
Throughout 1985, the SED increased militarization of East German society as
seen in the importance placed on the 5th military sports games of the paramilitary
youth organization, The Society for Sports and Technology, in July. The games, called
Wehrspartakiade, were a major event with 8,100 contestants from over 200,000
would-be participants. •^^ In addition, career and educational opportunities were
increasingly linked to military participation and school curricula reflected increased
militarization.^'^
'East Germany is Starting to Throw Its Weight Around," The New York Times,
3 June 1984, p. E 3.
^^Norman M. Naimark, "Is It True What They're Saying About East Germany?"
Orbis 23 (Fall 1979), p. 569.
Dale R. Herspring. "GDR Naval Buildup," Problems of Communism
(January- February 1984), p. "54.
Matthew Bovse, "Increased Militarization of East German Society," Radio Free
Europe Research (RAD Background Report/86, 23 August 1985), p. 1.
_Even during . the hisher education vears, students must participate in
pre-military practice in special camps. Refusal means that anv pursuit of academic
qualifications other than ecclesiastical is not allowed' sec Wollgang Mleczkowski, "In
Search of the Forbidden Nation: Opposition bv the Young Generation in the GDR,"
Government and Opposition 18 (Spring 1983), p. '189.
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Militarization in East Germany will continue to serve important functions in
the socialization process. Given the existence of the Soviet and East German military
apparatuses, the geographic position of the GDR, and past military traditions of the
Prussian people, militarization can, and does, play important roles in fostering a
collective spirit (and obedience) within the populace.
4. National Identity
The last major category used to attain political socialization goals is that of
nationalism and national identity. From the beginning, the ruling polity has recognized
the importance of patriotism and national identification within the GDR. The
common cultural, familial, and linguistic ties between East and West Germany have
proven to be some of the largest obstacles in the establishment of political and national
legitimacy for East Germany. The creation of a German Democratic consciousness
has become an imperative goal of the Ulbricht and Honccker regimes. Angela Stent
discusses this problem:
The most intractable problem facing the GDR leadership since 1949 has been the
inabilitv to develop a separate socialist German national identitv. This is
probably true for most East European nations, but the difTcrence is that there is
another German state with a diircrcnt sociopolitical system acting as a strong
masnet for the East German -population and as an additional source of instability
forTionecker's government.
There are at least five ways the leaders of the GDR have attempted to create a
separate national identity and thus enhance legitimacy in East Germany:
1) The reinterpretation of German historv bv ofilcial historians has tried to relate
German and specifically, Prussian experiences with the present socialist and
authoritarian society.
2) Throush intense socialization, the Party has encouraged the development of a
new value system which is very different from that existing in West Germany.
3) Linguistic differences have been encouraged to develop in East German society.
4) The constant portrayal of the GDR as the "Guarantor of peace" in Europe as
opposed to the so-called warmongers in the TRG serves to reinforce the idea
that the GDR is the legal and moral heir to the German nation.
5) The emphasis on the new worldwide recocnition of the regime contributes to a
sense of perceived sovereignty by the GDR's citizens.
^^Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the German Democratic Republic," in
' '^^
''Mrope, ed. S.M. Terry (New Haven: Yale University Press,Soviet Policy in Eastern E,
1984), p. 51.
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German History- Histor\' gives the East German propagandists many "progressive"
personalities to be held up in high esteem for their contributions to the socialist legacy.
Socialists Rosa Luxembourg, Karl Marx, Freidrich Engels, and Karl Liebknecht are
praised as great contributors to the evolution of the SED and East Germany. Great
military or artistic figures are honored as belonging to the communist historical
progress of ideas, and if they happen to be Prussian, that is even better. Some of these
include Clausewitz, Blucher, J.S. Bach, and Goethe. In a speech in October 1985, SED
Politburo member Kurt Hager stated:
That which had been the goal of the struggle of the working people for centuries,
that which had been proclaimed bv Marx and Engels that for which August
Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg," Karl Liebknecht, Ernst
Thaeimann, and Wilhelm Picck had led the party of the workers class into
struggle, and that for which tens of thousands of Communists, social democrats,
and "other brave fisihters had sacrificed their livens, against fascism came true: a
state of peace and Human dignity was established.''
This competition for the German Kuliurnaiion was also evident in 1983 during the East
German celebration of the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth. The celebration
was much larger than the ceremonies on the 100th anniversary of Karl Marx's death --
all this from an officially atheistic government. This line of thought seeks to emphasize
that the GDR is a positive and natural continuation of Germany's past while the ERG
is only a reactionary power which has remained into obsolescence.
Previously censured political and Utcrary figures have also been praised
through rehabilitation or publication cf their once forbidden works. One example of
this was the republishing of the Stalinist Ernst Bloch's Freiheit unci Ordnung (Freedom
and Order) in July 1985. Why the revival of this revisionist?
... it must be seen aeainst the background of a general reorientation of the
SED's attitude toward Xjcrman historv and culture. Bloch is onlv the most
recent in an increasingly long list of historical figures chosen for rehabilitation in
the name of what thc'p'arty refers to as the "socialist understanding of (national)
heritage." llie historical revisionism^ desisncd to create a new national history to
strengthen the foundations of the SED's rule, is based on the understanding that
"socialism is the Iceitiniate heir to ^everything revolutionary, progressive, and
humanistic in all of German history."
^'^B.V. Flow, "The Revival of Ernst Bloch-- A Pandora's Box For the GDR?'
^^NEPSZBADSAG, Budapest, 6 October 1984, p. 5.
^B. ch :
Radio Free Europe Research {RAD Background Report/80, 16 August 1985), p. 3
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Socialization- The development of the sociahst personality and its logical connection
with the communist state also assists in producing a unique quality of national identity.
The collective nature of sacrifice and authoritarianism which is inherent in
Marxism/Leninism has cultural roots in the Prussian nation as well. The East German
policymakers have thus been able to capitalize on traditional Prussian values such as
self-sacrifice, discipline, hard work, and the historical preference for limited subjection
to authority over personal freedom. This has been referred to by several experts as
"Red Prussianism" — the tradition among Germans (especially Prussians) to obey and
work no matter what. These values have been utilized to set the East Germans apart
from the "fun loving and carefree Bavarians" in the West.
Language- Differences in speech between East and West Germany are ofTicially
encouraged by the SED, and these linguistic dilfcrences can already be distinguished
from the German spoken in the ERG. Many of the changes are a result of the
infusion of technical, ideological, and official jargon into society. Although language is
slow to change, these linguistic differences, if allowed to continue, can only assist the
cultural separation of the GDR from the ERG.
"Guarantor of Peace"- The emphasis on the role of the GDR as the greatest European
contributor to the postwar peace attempts to place East Germany in a morally superior
light when compared to the ERG. This serves to provide a foundation for the East
German nation; a strategy which attempts to justify that all things which are morally
good exist in the GDR while all things morally bad are rellective of West Germany.
National identity is thus enhanced by the resultant national pride which, in turn, is
created by emphasizing the beauty of living in such a righteous and morally correct
society; a society which is striving for the building of a peaceful world "in spite of West
German revanchism."
Worldwide Recognition- The widespread international recognition of the GDR when it
became a member of the United Nations in 1973 gave a great boost to its national
identity. Today, whenever a visit by East German officials to other countries takes
place, especially by Erich Honecker, there is a greater coverage given to the event than
would be expected from other countries of similar international standing. In writing of
the Ilonecker visit to Greece in October 1985, Ronald Asmus relates:
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In manv wavs more interesting, however, was the political rhetoric that
surrounded th'e visit and the apparent convercence of views between the two
states on several kev arms control issues .... One is tempted to view the media
• hvpe associated with Honccker's new Western forays as a new tvpe of personality
cult in the GDR, the cult of the new international traveJcr in' a country where
Western travel remains the privelege of a very chosen few.^
This personality cult lends itself to the illusion of international equality with other
national leaders and diplomatic missions, consequently enhancing national prestige.
Although the GDR leadership has attempted through these means to create a
separate national identity, its inability to do so remains quite evident. The average
East German does not accept the official line. A survey taken informally by the SED
recently revealed that 75 percent of young people between the ages of 16 and 25
consider themselves German before they do East German.'^^
E. SOCIAL POLICY
Traditionally, one of the most effective ways of building popular support for the
ruling political entity has been to deliver to the population those things it needs and
desires. This is no different in the GDR. With the greatest standard of living in the
Communist world, it is very evident that the SED strives, quite literally, to deliver the
goods. During the last twenty-five years the East German government has attempted
to gain the support and loyalty of its citizens by providing for their health and welfare.
In November 1985 Erich Honecker reiterated the importance of this implement:
For the past 1 and 1/2 decades we have been resolutely adhering to a policy of
increasing the material and cultural standards of our people on the basis of
acceleratms the development of production, scientific-tccnnplogical progress, and
growth in labor productivity. This policv of the unitv of economic and social
policv benefits all elements of society. It will continue to determine the goal and
direction of our action in the future
Social policy in the GDR serves two functions for the Socialist Unity Party:
. . . On the one hand, its function is the same as it is normallv in Western
capitalist societies, namely, to compensate, after they have occurred, for socially
Ronald Asmus. "Honecker in Greece," Radio Free Europe Research (Ri\D
Background Report/ 126, 15 November 1985), pp. 2-3.
^^Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the GDR," p. 51.
See "Honecker Presents Politburo Report to SED CC." ADN International, 22
November 1984, in fBIS (Eastern Europe), 2/ November 1984, p. E 1.
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unsatisfactory results arising out of unequal opportunities and inequitable
distribution procedures in the production process, and to assure certain
disadvantaged groups (invalids, the elderly, etc.) a "suitable livinc standard in line
with existing possibilities." On the other hand, the party considers social policy
as a potential new instrument for influencing societal development .
A "social fund," consisting of contributions from government, production
enterprises, and other organizations, is the foundation for social policy in the GDR.
Monies and aid from this welfare pool are responsible for maintaining personal income;
unemployment compensation; family allowances and dependent support; health care;
education and training; housing subsidies and construction; and recreational and
cultural facilities. These subsidies and payments assist in satisfying physical and
mental needs and, in turn, provide popular support for the government responsible for
them."^^
The importance of continued increases in material benefits and levels of personal
consumption to the SED is reflected in its economic policies (see Chapter 3). Price
stabilization and support policies provide greater ease in purchasing the essential goods
and services of everyday life, as well as those nonessential goods which are both
popular and socially acceptable. In fact, price subsidies represent the greatest single
component of the entire social fund."* Price subsidies are estimated to go up by 13% in
1986 to OM (East German Mark) 46,200,000; almost 20% of the entire state budget.'^'*
The GDR attempted throughout the 1970's to increase the supply and variety of
consumer durables and luxury items while simultaneously-liolding down the prices of
staples, essential commodities, and basic services. However, because of the large
Western loans incurred in the 1970's and the subsequent payment requirements on
these, luxury items became scarcer, prices rose, and staple consumer goods were in
shorter supply by the early 1980's.'*^ Shortages and higher prices for raw materials and
^^Hartmut Zimmerman, "The GDR in the 1970's," Problems of Communism
(March-April 1978), p. 25.
'^^The State provides 75% of social fund expenditures with the remaining 25%
derived from production enterprises, social organizations, churches, and other charities.
In addition, this fund as a share of personal nicomc across the board is slated to grow
as the society approaches the transition into the "early phases of communism;" see C.
Bradley SchaVf, roliiics and Change in East Germany, p. iOl.
"^^Ibid., p. 117.
^^See B.V. Flow, "5 More Years of 'Comprehensive Intensification' for the
GDR's Economy," Radio Free Europe Research (RAD Background Report/6, 24
January 1986), p. 3.
"^ Ronald Asmus, "The Policy of Damage Limitation," in SovietjEast European
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energy have also contributed to the slow-down in consumer gains. Although 1984 and
1985 were extremely good years for the economy, the GDR leadership today has found
it more difficult to continue the past growth in the standard of living (which the people
have grown to expect). This becomes more important when Western media access
shows the average East German consumer that he is beginning to lag even further
behind his West German counterpart.
However, the "cradle to grave" welfare state evident in the GDR has provided
some support for the regime. As the economic w^ealth of East Germany has grown, so
has the scope and size of the welfare inputs throughout the system. The popular
well-being of the people and its continued emphasis, as reflected in official policy, will
remain a major implement in the maintenance of popular acceptance, or at least
tolerance, of the regime into the near future. One East German citizen stated in
January 1986 that she would not consider escaping to the West as her relatives had in
the past because East Germany was her home and not that dissatisfying; her husband
stated: "It's our system and we live in it. We must live in it."'^^
F. SUMMARY
The domestic poUcies outlined here contribute to an overall campaign to attain
greater stability and legitimacy from the East German citizen. Although the political
culture and organization were forced upon the GDR, they are utilized to provide a
structural basis for rule along "scientific" and historical lines of thought. Cooptation of
those citizens most capable and talented legitimizes SED rule by simultaneously
absorbing possible sources of dissent, improving actual capabilities and results with
more competent membership, and upgrading the popular perception of the caliber of
the Party member. Through political socialization, the SED attempts to create a new
sociaUst East German as compared with the capitalist German past — socialization
carried out through childhood indoctrination, propaganda, and an increased emphasis
on the East German national identity. Finally, the maintenance and improvement of
the day to day Uves o^ the average citizens through social policies in health, housing,
consumer goods, etc. are sought to coax some level of acceptance from the East
German population.
Survey, 1983-1984, ed. Vojtech Mastny (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 244.
East German Couple Copes With Life Despite Limitations," The Christian
Science Monitor, 9 January 1986, pp. 25-27.
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The importance of the domestic sphere of policymaking carries over to
international relations, mainly in the form of economics. The next section addresses
the importance of economics in the attainment of legitimacy and stability in both the
domestic and international arenas.
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III. LEGITIMATION THROUGH ECONOMICS
. . . economic strength is the linchpin of all promised political and social
change. In addition, economic performance provides tlia single and most visible
standard by which people judge the SED's claim to rule.
A. INTRODUCTION
As in most communist regimes and Eastern bloc countries, the GDR must show-
continued socio-economic progress to gain popular support. SED leadership has
concentrated on maintaining an acceptable rise in the East German standard of living,
especially after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961; the regime could then turn
from suppressing the mass exodus of East Germans to the West and concentrate upon
seriously building the economic and administrative infrastructure needed to modernize
the country, and consequently, build legitimacy and stability for the regime. In other
words, the wall allowed the regime to turn to the courting of popular support over
popular suppression. In discussing economics in the GDR, Starrells and Mallinckrodt
note:
Strictly speaking, the GDR's economic situation is inseparable from political
considerations .... If foreien-policy making involves decision-maXins in
coordinative planning, and consultative," activities, there is little argument "that
East Germany's external policies are stronglv reflected in socio-economic issues.
Beginning with 1945. witn the onset of crippling reparations and dismantling,
scliedules", and ending with the use of economic reforms as a means oT
engendering political legitimacy {and hence stability)j,jthe GDR's foreign policy
identity has been linked'with socio-economic variables .
Today, the GDR is among the most industrialized countries of the world, even
when viewed in Western terms of economic strength. Its citizens enjoy a very high
standard of living due in part to the continuing elTort of SED policies. The importance
of the consumer's satisfaction in the GDR was underscored by the Ninth SED
Congress in 1976 where "enhancement of the material and cultural standard of living of
C. Bradley Scharf. Politics and Change in East Germany: An Evaluation of
Socialist Democracy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), pp 68-69.
"^ John M. Starrcls and Anita M. Mallinckrodt. "East German Foreign Policv", in
The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe (Levdcn, Netherlands: A.W. Sijthof Publishing
Company, 1978), p. 88.
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the people" was identified as its main task. Thus economics exists as an important
source of legitimacy for the SED, and the regime has attempted to use it fully as a
valuable tool in overcoming its legitimacy and stability problems. To better
understand the development of economics as a legitimizer, it is necessary to briefly
trace the history of the East German economy.
B. THE EAST GERMAN ECONOMY: 1945-1975
The economic system inherited by what was to become the German Democratic
RepubUc was a result of both World War II and the postwar Soviet occupation. The
previous Nazi dependence upon a war-supporting economy led to a rapid breakdown
of the intricate German economic system during the postwar Soviet occupation of the
Eastern zones. The subsequent stripping of industrial equipment and labor by the
Soviets only added to the dire situation in these postwar years. Goods distribution
problems, wrecked transport systems, restricted movement due to the zonal division of
Germany, and splintered economic infrastructure combined to force a regression to a
simplified economic system — barter. This situation spawned serious food shortages,
loss of faith in currency, subsequent low productivity, and rampant inflation. The
following years witnessed Soviet reparation programs which emasculated the country.
As early as September 1945, the Soviets had begun transforming their zone into a
communist economic entity. That year witnessed the break up of all large agricultural
estates and their nationalization. Farms over 100 hectares were divided up among
smaller farmers. In July 1946, all large industrial concerns were transferred to state
ownership destroying any potential reemergence of the upper and big business classes.
This in turn aided in the emergence of more centralized control of all economic matters
by the central government which continues today as the Centrally Planned Economy
(CPE).
Woefully deprived of natural resources and possessing no official currency, the
East German zone was forced to struggle under the Soviet Military Administration's
(SMAD's) total control. In 1945 the economic differences between the two Germanics
were extreme. For example, the only production which surpassed that of the Western
zones was potash production capacity which stood at approximately 30% of the rest of
Germany. '^^ Almost all other major resources and production were far greater in West
"^^Karel Holbik and Henry Myers, Postwar Trade in Divided Germanv (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 13.
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Germany (a significant fact since West Germany was also a devastated countr}').
Thirty percent of the population, thirty percent of the arable land, twenty-nine percent
of all forest land, only 4.6 percent of coal production, and six percent of the entire steel
capacity of prewar Germany indicated that the Eastern zones were impoverished
regions with which to attempt to create a new and viable socialist nation. ^^ In
addition, labor shortages created a severe problem which would continue to haunt the
GDR. The economic legacy through the 1950's was thus one of shortages -- shortages
of energy, natural resources, capital, and qualified labor. Four areas of concern
became important for the SED to confront during this time:
1) The need to reorganize the means of redistribution and transport of goods and
materials on a national basis.
2) The requirement to reopen contact with the rest of the world to obtain the
needed miports of raw materials, energy, and food (a quest which has still not
been fully satisfied).
3) The need to take action to stockpile remainins industrial material and consumer
§oods to aid in maintaining stability for the years of shortage and hardship
during the reconstruction ^^eriod. This was expeciallv so "since the East
Germans were not allowed by the Soviets to receive Western aid such as the
Marshall Plan.
4) An immediate solution to the growing emigration of dissatisfied East Germans
which continued to drain the" ranks of labor throughout the decade of the
1950's.
To counter these problems, national economic planning was geared to the Soviet
Gosplan (molded to serve Soviet economic demands and needs). As in all centrally
planned economies based on this Soviet model, the leadership set the priorities and
goals for the differing sectors of the economy such as consumer goods, hea\7 industr}',
and agriculture. This was described in a socialist textbook as:
.. ..
. the system of managing economic processes involving production,
distribution, investment, and consumption. Its essence consists in determining
economic tarcets and methods ibr their implementation, in particular the
allocation of tlie means of production and of labour to diiferent uses. As such,
planning is an instrument of economic strategy to achieve the-optimum growth
of national income or the maximum satisfaction of social needs.
Beginning with the first East German economic plan in 1949, the domestic
policies were aimed increasingly at state ownership and control of all sectors of
production. From this time on state enterprises were given priority for investment,
50
Ibid., p. 13
J. Wilczynski, The Economics of Socialism (London: George Allin and Unwin
Ltd., 1977), p. 33.
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delivery of raw materials, labor, and taxation policies. This first economic plan was a
very short one, 1949-1950. As in other communist countries, it concentrated on
industrial growth: mining, electricity production, engineering, metallurgical, chemical,
and building industries.
The next five-year plan was introduced in 1951. By 1955 all of the goals of this
plan had been met which more than doubled prewar output of the gross industrial
product. During this period the .SED regime first experienced the costs of denying
citizens consumer goods and services due to the heavy industrialization of the economy
as illustrated in the 1953 worker revolt in East Berlin.^^ Consequently, the next
five-year plan provided for a 40% increase in consumer goods production -- the
beginning of the real emphasis on economics as a tool to gain popular support (and
thus, legitimacy) for the Marxist/ Leninist government in East Germany. Speaking of
this period, Jonathon Steele writes:
The GDR's jdentitv was already, conditioned by the constant sense of
competition with the "West. Econohiic results and 'consumer' values were seen as
the criterion for judging the society's success or failure.
East German speakers at the Socialist Unity Party Congresses even predicted
overtaking West Germany's economy. They based their predictions on the expanding
rate of economic growth. This rhetoric also illustrated the growing importance of
economic factors in building domestic legitimacy.
Thus, by 1960 there had been significant gains in the economy. Production
increases were seen most dramatically in the basic industry areas with light industr\%
food processing, and textile sectors growing more slowly. In the decade of the 1950's
After Stalin's death in March 1953, the SED announced the adoption of the
New Course (change from heavy industrv to more consumer production), but because
high production quotas and increasing work norms remained, workers demonstrated
their discontent in a rebellion on June 17, 1953. This appeared throughout the major
industrial regions in the forms of strikes and demonstrations in dcma'nding economic
reforms. Between 300,000 and 372,000 workers were involved in over 270 localities.
Soviet troops were required in halting the rebellion. See David Childs. The GDR:
Moscow's German Ally (London: George Allen and L'nwin, 1983), pp. 31-33.
Jonathon Steele, Inside East Germany: The Slate That Came in From the Cold
(New York: Urizen Books, 1977), p. 117.
Stanley Radclifie, 25 Years On- The Two Germanies- 1970, p. 153.
Ironically, the 1956-60 five-year plan was abandoned in 1958 and replaced by a
seven-year plan adopted in order to bring the East German economy in line with the
planning periods of the Soviet Union.
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investment had grown about 4.5 times and gross industrial output increased by a factor
of 2.9.^^ Altliough labor shortages continued after the construction of the Berlin Wall
in 1961, they were compensated by utilization of women in the work force in growing
numbers. In summary, whereas before 1961 the GDR was forced to confront the
reaUty created by postwar reparations, lack of reconstruction aid, and wholesale loss of
population; the period after the Berlin Wall construction dramatically changed to one
of even greater concentration on economics as a function of system legitimation.
In early 1963, economic reforms (based upon increased reliance on professional
economists) were devised at the Sixth SED Party Congress. Its final shape was
announced the following June. This was known as the New Economic System (NES)
and followed closely on the heels of contemporary Soviet economic developments and
experimentation, especially the theories of Yevsie Liberman, a Soviet economist.
Overall, the system was based on the use of sound economic principles with the
utilization of the profit factor as a key element. It was prompted by a perception that
the central planning concept used throughout the Eastern bloc should be reconsidered.
In East Germany this concept gave more emphasis to efficiency rather than the
amount of tonnage output. The use of incentives and new pricing guidelines helped
stop the stifiing of innovation and incentives throughout industry'. Responsibilities
were delegated to various programs throughout eighty group organizations for the
different sectors of the economy. The NES decentralized authority to ever lower units
of production. Thus, a more fiexible and rational pricing system was created while
more control over investment, material acquisition, and other input/output factors were
granted to the respective enterprises.
The NES ushered in a new era of rapid growth and prosperity, as well as an
additional and important means for legitimation. It served to link performance at work
with individual citizenship; traditional German work ethics to an East German sense of
national identity; and socialist values to factory life. Although dismantled by 1970, the
NES had given impetus to the use of economic performance (and rises in consumer
well-being) to convince the East German populace of the superiority of the SED's
communist way of life.
Eugene K. Keefc. ed.. East Germany- A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: The
American University, 1982), p. 127.
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The beginning of the 1970's brought greater economic prosperity as new
management and organizational techniques continued to pay ofT for East Germany.
Increased attention to the supply industries (which had been neglected in the 1960's),
along with more realistic planning, also enabled the gradual improvement of the
economy. The importance of accelerating economic growth in this period was
demonstrated in the program of the Eighth Party Congress in June 1971 where the
concept of the "main task" was initiated. This referred to the acceleration of socialist
production and, consequently, further improvement in living and working conditions
through intensification, labor productivity, efficiency, and scientific-technological
progress.
The main issue facing the political leadership at this time was how to respond to
the growing demands for increased varieties of products in an advanced society. It was
evident that to accomplish this would entail greater costs for production of these items
(because of their complexity and resource requirements). To address this problem on a
bloc-wide scale, agreement was reached in the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) for greater integration and specialization in what was known as
the Complex Program of 1971.^"^ Pooling of resources and parallel production became
the centerpiece of bloc economic strategy. Domestically, East Germany concentrated
on relevent policies as well:
1) To modernize lagging industries through greater imports of capital equipment
and complete industrial plants.
2) To expand the dairy and meat industries through large-scale imports of grain
and livestock feed.
3) To acquire key raw materials and industrial commodities to compensate for
slow-downs in deliveries from the USSR and other communist countries.
en
The CMEA was first established by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and the Soviet Union in 1949 to integrate the economics of the Soviet bloc.
The GDK joined in 1950 and has remained an iiiiportant member ever since. After the
introduction of the economic reforms as seen in the NES, there has been a Soviet mo\e
attempting to prevent economic autarky in the Warsaw Pact with "an international
socialist division of labor." This has entailed srcatcr specialization in the member
countries with the GDR's production of chcmicaHs, elcctrotechnical devices, electronics,
heavy machinery, optics, and precision tools (the so-called kev industries^ based upon
CMEA quotas." Inus, the assigned role of East Germany in CMEA limits its
contribution in these areas.
^^These objectives were taken from; Ronald G. Oechsler, "GDR Performance and
Prospects in Trade with the West", in East-West Trade: The Prospects to 1985
(Washington, D.C.: prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee of the
Congress of the United States, August 18, 1982), p. 137.
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These objectives required the GDR to turn toward the West for help in fulfilling its
economic programs.
Beginning in 1973, rising energy costs, rising prices for raw materials, and the
Western recession affected the overall growth of the economy. The incremental cost of
production per unit continued to rise throughout the decade. Given the average
growth rate of national income between 1971 to 1975 of 5.2% and average increases in
production of approximately 5%, by the late 1970's the SED was faced with the
dilemma of satisfying growing consumer expectations at the same time that economic
growth was slowing down.^^
C. THE GDR ECONOMY TODAY
Because the growth rate of the 1970's (after 1973) was largely financed by
Western credits as a result of detente, continuing dependence upon the West has
created economic problems for East Germany which remained into the early 1980's
(and although not as severe, still exist). These included low agricultural production,
rising inflation, and huge foreign debt — the latter being the most harmful. For
example, in 1981 East Germany's total net hard currency debt was estimated at Sll
biUion which was the second highest in the Eastern bloc.^^ This large foreign debt
tended to force the GDR into shifting its trade to the FRG to obtain much needed
hard currency in order to service its interest and repayment costs.
The nature of the East German centrally planned economy also created economic
problems in the 1980's. These idiosyncrasies can be listed as follows:
1) Plan inaccuracies caused by the immense task of coordinating over 8000
different economic enterprises. The complexity of maintaining records of
performance, productivitv, material usage, and so on poses severe problems in
planning, especially since" much of these clata are not computerized.
2) Waste of raw materials which decreases productivity and rises the overall costs
of resources.
3) Inaccurate pricing which does not include supply and demand considerations.
4) Waste of labor as a result of the socialist necessity to retain innefTicient
workers, and the loss of work time because of the cumbersome supply system.
5) The neglect of economic infrastructure, especially in outdated institutions, data
processing, and communications.
6) Low capital return and productivity from investments.
^^Eugene K. Keefe, ed.. East Germany, p. 130.
Handbook of Statistics- 1985 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency,
September 1985), p. 48.
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7) Organizational instability caused by the constant search for solutions to the
economic problems.
8) Uncertain allocation of authority resulting from ambiguous relationships such
as those between the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee, economic
departments, or the economic planners in the State.I^lanning Commission and
economic administrators of the Council of Ministers.
The 1981-1985 five-year plan, unveiled in April 1981 at the Tenth SED Party
Congress, attempted to solve, with some success, these problems inherent in the
economic systejm. It encompassed a series of strategies to overcome deficiencies and
continue economic prosperity:
1) More rational investment and technological innovation, especially through
automation, robotics, and microelectronics.
2) Conservation and recvclins of raw materials through education and
modernization, and more efficient use of energy and equipment.
3) Reduction ofimports and maximization of exports.
4) Reformation of labor utilization to increase efficiency.
These strategies have been coined "comprehensive intensification" and with the end of
this five-year plan have apparently brought positive results. Consequently, 1984 was
considered to be the best since the founding of the GDR:
On paper, 1984, which marked the much-publicized 35th anniversary of the
GDR's foundation, was, at least economicallv, "the most successful vear' in East
German historv. The statistics certainly look impressive. Overfulfilled planning
eoals, a rccord'growth in national income, a bumper harvest, and the GDR's first
foreign trade,surplus point to a remarkable recovery from the shortfalls of the
early^l980's.^^
This success was repeated in 1985 with substantial increases in national income,
production of industrial goods, and agricultural harvests. In addition, the GDR had an
overall trade surplus for the third straight year along with full rehabilitation of credit
worthiness in the West as evidenced by a new S600,000,000 loan signed by a
consortium of Western banks. ^"^ This economic comeback has been accomplished more
than anything else because of greater austerity and debt consolidation.
Three structural reforms have been accomplished in the economy in the last
twenty years; however, they were poorly implemented and full of uncertainties.
These economic problems are identified and explained in greater detail in C.
Bradley Scharf, Politics and Change in East Germany, pp. 69-76.
'^•^B.V. Flow, "The East German Economy-What is Behind the Success Story?
Radio Free Europe Research (RAD Report/23, 15 March 1985), p. 1.
^'^B.V. Flow, "5 More Years of "Comprehensive Intensification" for the GDR's
Economy", Radio tree Europe Research, {RAD Report/6, 17 January 1986), p. 2.
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Thus, by 1985 the GDR economy had recovered from the situation of the early
1980's. The regime has pointed to this recover}' as a signal that the SED is leading the
country to greatness. In fact, the official figures for 1984 and 1985 were the most
detailed ever published, exhibiting the importance of letting the people know when the
economy (and hence regime) succeeded. The emphasis on economic well-being on a
personal level is also a direct result of the utilization of economics as a legitimizing
device in East Germany.
D. CONSUMER SATISFACTION
While material incentives to stimulate. individual and factorv performance have
always played a prominent role in Soviet-tvpe systems, they 'became the priniarv
source of "^motivation, the decisive "economic lever" of the economic reform
efforts oftheGDR.'^^
The emphasis which the SED places on consumer living standards can easily be
seen when compared to other similar Warsaw Pact countries. Table I illustrates a
general economic profile of East Germany in 1984. As is readily evident, both overall
GNP and per capita GNP were the highest in the Warsaw Pact, including the USSR.
Energy consumption was second only to Poland (a countn.' with over twice the
population of the GDR) in the non-Soviet bloc countries, and first in total exports and
imports of the six non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations.
Table II contains data which serve as indicators of living standards in Eastern
Europe. The GDR leads all other countries in each of these areas, exhibiting that the
regime continues to strive to increase individual welfare. Automobiles are owned by
42% of all East German households and almost all have refrigerators. Ninety percent
own televisions, 84% washing machines, 64% hot water, 68''/o baths, and 60% inside
toilets. Given the fact that the SED is able to deliver life's necessities better than
other communist nations, the people may be motivated to put forth greater effort in
the construction of socialism. This accomplishment is also a source of pride for the
government in the attempt to build an East German identity.
65Ilartmut Zimmerman, "The GDR in the 1970's," p. 4.
German Economy on Top of East Bloc Heap," The Christian Science Monitor,




ECONOMIC PROFILE (GDR AND COMECON)
*GNP Per Cap GNP Energy Exports Imports
GDR 163. 7 9800 1. 4 25. 2 23.
Bulgaria 56. 4 6270 0.2 12. 8 12. 7
Czech. 127.9 8250 1. 17.4 17. 6
Hungary 77. 7200 0. 3 16. 3 15. 6
Poland 228. 5 6190 2. 5 17. 4 16. 2
Romania 117. 6 5200 1. 1 12. 9. 9
USSR 1957.
6
7120 30. 91. 5 80. 4
*GNP= billions of US dollars
Per Capita GNP= US dollars
Energy= millions of barrels/day oil equivalent
Exports/Imports= billions of US dollars
Source:
CIA Handbook of Statistics (Washington, D. C. :
Central Intelligence Agency, September 1985), Table 3,
The latest 1986 ofTicial economic targets also echo the traditional East German
concern for the consumer sector. Although, overall popular consumption is to remain
unchanged from 1985, tighter regulations for quality control on consumer goods,
improved supplies of spare parts for consumer products, a 6% rise in the private
services sector (this was 4.2% in 1985), and a 15% increase in auto maintenance
services are planned for the coming year.^ Therefore, even as the economic situation
in the GDR may wax and wane, the consumer is still extremely important in the eyes
of the regime, and the East German economy is the most "legitimate" in this respect
within the socialist camp. Indeed, SED concern over a slowdown in the rise in the




INDICATORS OF LIVING STANDARDS- 1984
GDR Bulg. Czech. Hung. Poland Rom
Autos* 168 99 159 110 80 11
Energy
Usage'^ 40 29 35 20 24 22
Life
Expectancy 72 71 71 70 71 70
Daily
Calories
(1977) 3644 3578 3457 3520 3619 3448
% Houses
w/elec. 100 99. 8 99. 7 94. 3 NA 48. 6




Clh Handbook of Statistics (Washington, D. C. :
Central Intelligence Agency, September 1985), Table 3
;
East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980' s,
Report Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the
Congress of the United States
'Washington, D. C. ; Government Printing Office, 28
ctober 1985), pp. 253,259.S
standard of living may explain the huge hard currency cushion possessed by the GDR
(somewhere between S4 billion and S6 billion) which provides a hedge against forced
price rises or investments detracting from the consumer sector.
E. FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
As a member of the Warsaw Pact's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON or CMEA), East Germany faces external constraints upon its economic
relations with other states. The 1985 CMEA Council meeting in June highlighted the
future emphasis on "socialist integration" centered around five goals:
. . . close coordination of national five-year plans so as to dovetail production
programs; conclusion of special long-term cooperative aqrccmcnts, such as in
extracting and transporting Soviet natural gas or conserving on energy
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consumption; elaboration of a joint plan of action for scientific and technical
work; a continued high concentration of trading within the bloc, with special
emphasis on the deliver}' of quality goods and consumer durables from Eastern
Europe, to the USSR; and lirmtatio'n on trade and other economic links with the
West.^^
These stated goals serve to limit the East Germans from moving further away from
decentralizing the economy and increasing economic ties with the West, especially with
West Germany.
Since over one-half of East Germany's Western trade is with the FRG,
inter-German relations are especially important to the SED's search for legitimacy.
The SED has reaped tremendous economic benefits from this relationship. Besides the
usual trade which is carried out with West Germany, there are other incomes in the
form of transit fees (DM 500 million); postal payments (DM 200 million); road tolls
(DM 50 million); income for obligatory currency exchanges (DM 200 million), sewer
and waste disposal (DM 100 million); earnings from foreign currency shops (DM 1
billion); the guaranteed credit or "swing" (DM 850 million); and ransoming of political
prisoners (DM 200 million). ^^ In addition, the ability to funnel exports through West
Germany to obtain hard currency (a feat that other CMEA countries cannot do as
easily) makes the GDR an unofficial member of the EEC. This favored relationship is
worth at least DM 1 billion. According to Jonathon Dean, when this is all added to
the value of recent loans of over DM 700 million per year it can be estimated that the
GDR gains approximately DM 5 billion annually from its relationship with West
Germany."^^
Economics will remain a major tool in attaining legitimacy for the SED. Poor in
natural resources and energy. East Germany must depend upon foreign trade to
maintain economic health and hence, consumer satisfaction. Therefore, any analysis of
East German foreign policy must always consider the economic aspect in addition to
other variables. However, the functions of economics in the East German case cannot
be separated from its role as a contributor to regime legitimacy and stability. The
importance of trade with both the East and the West has placed the East Germans in a
Vladimir V. Kusin, "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe," Problems of Communism
(January- February 1986), p. 42.





unique position between the two blocs, and adects the relationships
which are
discussed in the following sections.
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IV. LEGITIMACY AND STABILITY IN EAST GERMAN FOREIGN
POLICY
A. SOVIET AND INTER-GERMAN RELATIONS
L The German Legacy
Any attempt at examining East German foreign policy must be accomplished
within the context of the relationship between the GDR and the Soviet Union, and the
GDR and West Germany. Because East German foreign policy today has largely
evolved from the postwar division of Germany, the evolution of the two different
nations has taken place within the context of inter-German relations, albeit under the
watchful eye of the USSR. This Soviet influence in the GDR directly limits the level,
and largely determines the nature, of inter-German relations carried out by the SED.
Therefore, the inter-German situation, and the Soviet-GDR relationship which affects
it, provide a good starting point for the overall foreign policies of East Germany. To
better understand this, some important postwar differences in the two Germanics need
to be emphasized.
The forced Soviet alliance after World War II brought political impotence as
well as economic ruin to what was to become the GDR. In contrast, the Federal
Republic of Germany was accorded the privilege of pursuing economic, security, and
legitimacy goals without the massive reparations and exploitation experienced by the
East Germans. The West German population was more supportive of her occupiers
than were the people in the Soviet Occupation Zone. Bonn's dependency on the major
international influence of the United States, Great Britain, and France served to
enhance her position as the new Germany. This became even more meaningful after
the joining of the three allied zones combined the political power of these Western
nations on the side of what was to be called the Federal Republic of Germany. In
contrast, by 1949 the Soviets were viewed as oppressive and tyrannical throughout
much of the world when their policies in the occupied East European countries became
evident. Immediate economic aid from the United States in the form of the Marshall
Plan eased human suffering in the Allied zones, and a capitalistic, market-oriented
economy similar to that of prewar Germany began to evolve. In the Soviet zones, a
drastically different system of socialist economic ideas was set up — a system
introduced into a severely damaged economic infrastructure made worse by Soviet
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reparations well into the early 1950's. These difTerences between the two Germanies
exaggerated the "legitimacy gap" for the next twenty-five years; the FRG seemed to be
the only "real" Germany while the German Democratic Republic appeared as simply
another of the Soviet occupied territories of Eastern Europe.
This legacy has created four major priorities in East German foreign policy
which continue today: (1) to assure continued growth of foreign trade and expansion
of the economy to promote popular well-being (and subsequent popular support); (2)
to improve stability and legitimacy by obtaining worldwide recognition of SED rule
and GDR sovereignty; (3) to avoid those conflicts between the two superpowers which
could damage or even destroy the SED regime. This could include a European war
which no doubt would be conducted on East German (as well as West German) soil;
and (4) to remain the most loyal and helpful ally of the Soviet Union in order to reap
political and economic benefits. Today, all of these goals become important in
analyzing GDR foreign policy, and are all related to legitimacy and stability concerns.
In writing of the newest phases of the inter-German detente of the 1980's, Melvin
Croan states:
. . . it involves a deviation based neither on traditional nationalist
considerations, nor on pacifism (a sentiment abroad in the land but anathema to
its communist rulers), nor on calculations of economic self-interest in any narrow
sense, as has been implied in some of the best-informed \yestern reportage. At
stake rather is a complex process in which, contrary to the initial expectations of
the SED leadership, detente has become a cornerstone of East Germany's
internal political stajbility and the virtual centerpiece of the SED's continuing
quest for legitimacy.
And Hartmut Zimmerman emphasizes a similar aspect:
The interests and the behavior of the GDR in its foreign relations have
been determined by the fact that the state must look upon itself as a strictly
poiuical entity, since it lacks the additional legitimation of a national identity,
7
1
Wholesale confiscation, dismantling, destruction, and expropriation bv the
Soviets dominated the economic life of the eastern zones of occupation. For example,
more than 200 industrial concerns were turned into joint stock companies by the
Soviets and remained so until 1953. For a eood discussion of postwar Soviet economic
policy in the Soviet Occupation Zone see J.r. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy
in Germany- 1945-1950 (New York: Octagon Books, 1977).
This contributes to a maintenance of a certain amount of autonomy vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union which also provides a perception of legitimacy for the GDR
government.
Melvin Croan, "The Politics of Division and Detente in East Germany,"
Current History (November 1985), p. 369.
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which would enable it to safesuard the continuity of its existence as a state
without tying that existence tolhe maintenance ofpresent political-institutional
forms.
2. The Soviet Connection
In viewing the foreign poHcy of the German Democratic Republic, it is a
common perception in the West to simply attribute East German poUcy and actions to
Soviet desires. To a large extent, this is correct. However, the importance of the GDR
to the Soviet Union ensures a continued high Russian stake in East German regime
stability, and it is in this connection Uiat East Berlin succeeds in limiting the direct
control exerted from the Kremlin. To understand this relationship it is necessary to
explain the functions which the GDR serves for the Soviet Union.
First, the GDR serves as one of the most important states as part of the East
European buffer zone (from the Soviet perspective). Its strategic position is vital to
the maintenance of the political and military hegemony of the Soviet Union in Central
and Eastern Europe. Angela Stent goes so far as to call the GDR "the
political-military bulwark of the Soviet security system in Eastern Europe". ^^ In this
respect, the nineteen Soviet divisions deployed in Germany form the front line against
any aggression from the West or, conversely, provide the forward forces with which to
launch military operations if necessary for "defensive purposes." Second, its continued
existence guarantees against a reunited and revanchist Germany which had cost so
much in human and material sacrifices to defeat in the Great Patriotic War. Third, as
mentioned in the last section. East German economic and technological assistance is
vital to the Soviet Union, more vital than similar assistance from other countries.
Fourth, the continued loyalty to the Soviet Union and close duplication of its political
system in the GDR lends credibility and legitimacy to the ideology of
Marxism-Leninism. Fifth, the GDR provides opportunities for Soviet influence in
West Germany and consequently, leverage in the Western alliance.
Ilartmut Zimmerman, "The GDR in the 1970's," Problems of Communism
(March-April 1978), p. 11.
Regarding the idea o^ the GDR as a buffer state, Vernon Aspaturian also
considers alf of Eastern Europe as cither a buffer zone, a defense elacis, or a
springboard for Soviet westward expansion; one choice seems to be as valid" as another.
S^ee his article, "Eastern Europe in World Perspective" in Communism in Eastern
Europe, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ed. (Bloomin"ton: Indiana University Press,
1984).
. V « ^ .
Angela Stent, "The USSR and Germany," Problems of Communism
(September-October 1981), p. 3.
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On the other hand, the GDR could not survive without the Soviet Union.
Although East Germany has gained diplomatic recognition and other important
relationships in the world, the USSR remains its central and most important ally. The
SED depends upon the continued division of Germany for its political existence, and
the Soviet Union is the guarantor of that division. In addition, the GDR is dependent
on the Soviet Union for the majority of its raw materials and energy which creates an
important means of influence for the USSR, but not without its costs:
The GDR's almost total dependence on Soviet raw material imports represents a
drain on Soviet resources and is particularly problematic in the energv field. In
1970, 7% of all GDR exports to the Soviet Union went toward paving Tor oil. In
19S0 the figure was 25%; with a predicted 35% by 1985.^
Thus, the relationship with the Soviet Union in the eyes of the SED is extremely
important and all foreign policy considerations must include these vital ties with the
USSR.
3. The German Question
The most important issue which has consistently been addressed in the foreign
policies of both Germanies is the so-called "German Question." Initially involving the
reunification issue, this term has evolved to encompass many inter-German issues, or
simply, the inter-German relationship. Because of the importance placed upon the
GDR by the Soviet Union, it is this area upon which I will concentrate in order to
examine the relationship of legitimacy and stability concerns in East German
interactions with the USSR. The developments upon which I focus in this section
include:
1) The period of Willy Brandt's Osipoliiik and Walter Ulbricht's intransigence in
East Germany.
2) The Honecker policy o[ Abgrenzung (delimitation).
3) The official "damase limitation" policy after NATO deployment of intermediate
range nuclear missiles forces (IrsF) in 1983. This brought about the "new
Deutschlandpoliiik" of the mid-1980's and renewed tensions vvith Moscow.
These issues will be briefly outlined and then related within the legitimacy/stability
matrix. The four L/S goals are applied to demonstrate legitimacy and stability
concerns as motivators of policy in each situation.
77Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the German Democratic Republic." in




The first two decades of the division of Germany involved 'a stalemate of
national wills between the United States and her Western allies on the one hand, and
the Soviet bloc countries on the other. This stalemate was a direct product of the
foreign policies of the two superpowers:
During the 1950's and 1960's, the German question had two major
variables: the role of the two Germanics in an international svstem focused on
the cold war, and the foreign and German policies of Bonn and Berlin
themselves. With both of these factors remaining more or less constant, the
situation between the two Germanics was at an impasse. As bv-products of the
East-West confrontation, with their very existence firmly imbedded in that milieu,
it was inevitable that the latter erosion" of the bipolar svstem and the emeraence
of impulses for some form of East-West accomodation would pose serious
challenges for both Bonn and East Berlin.
By the mid-1960's the West German policy of official non-recognition of the GDR, as
embodied in the Hallstein Doctrine, was becoming increasingly disfunctional."^^ This
change of thought in West German policy placed the relative diplomatic position of
Walter Ulbricht and the SED in a stronger bargaining position. Since the Berlin Wall,
the introduction of the NES, and the consequent rise in the standard of living in East
Germany, popular support for the Ulbricht government had expanded, albeit in subtle
increments. Aggressive GDR policies toward the FRG also limited personal contacts
and created a cordon sanitaire against Western influences. However, by the late 1960's
a pohcy dilemma confronted the East German leadership. Although the GDR
depended upon the continued division of Germany for its existence, it paradoxically
constituted a direct challenge to the popularly perceived legitimacy of the state,
especially if relations remained hostile or formal recognition from the FRG was not
forthcoming (because West Germany continued to be the only internationally
recognized German nation). It was becoming imperative to gain recognition from the
Ronald Asmus, "Bonn and East Berlin: The 'New' German Question?", Radio
Free Europe Research (RAD Report/20, 14 March 19S5), p. 49.
'''^The Hallstein Doctrine was the major foreign policy strategy used by the FRG
against East Germany for the first twcntv-five years after the war. Officially
established on December 9,. 1955, the doctrme was based upon the West German
ability, through her diplomatic and economic clout, to convince most other countries in
the world to deny recognition to the SED regime and a separate East Germany. .This
was motivated m part by the expectation that German reunification was still a
probability and not just a possibility.
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"other" Germany to provide domestic legitimacy for the regime; but it would require
the Soviet Union, not Ulbricht, to bring about the change which would address this
dilemma.
In the strategy of GDR "self-preservation" which was pursued until 1970,
political stability and legitimacy were linked to the belief that East Germany was
historically and socially more advanced than the FRG. In this situation, reunification
and closer inter-German cooperation could only be based on the assurance that East
Germany could maintain her ideological and socialist achievements. Given the nature
of East German intransigence (and as the chances for reunification declined), the
continued isolation of the GDR was a certainty without some sort of accomodation by
one or both Germanics, or at least by the East-West superpowers and their respective
aUies.
As the new Social Democrats under Chancellor Willy Brandt came to power
in the FRG in 1969, a willingness to normalize relations with the Soviet Union became
more evident. Well before the West German Social Democrats' introduction of
OstpoUtik, the Soviets had been influenced to closer ties with Bonn by many factors:
1) The fall of De Gaulle in early 1969 accentuated the gradual shift of France back
to the Atlantic alliance and away from the general focus of previous Soviet
elTorts at detente.
2) The emergence of China from isolation and its increased involvement in
opening discussions with the West threatened to isolate the USSR in its foreign
policy actions.
3) The Soviets were experiencing growing economic problems which forced the
Kremlin to look closer at increasing industrial and techonological ties with the
West.
4) As the Soviets were close to attaining nuclear parity with the United States, the
concern to stabilize the arms race (either to maintain this parity or obtain
nuclear superiority) motivated improved relations with the United States. 'i"he
new SPD/FDP coalition and their overtures provided a means to accomplish
this.
5) In addition, the FRG seemed to provide the means to eain influcnC|C in order to
undermine the Atlantic Alliance and draw Bonn closer to the East.
6) Lastly, it was important to the Soviets to gain recognition for East Germany
and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, wliile at the same time, preventing the
development of closer ties between Bonn and Peking.
on
In this regard William E. Griffith writes: "The Soviet Union intended to use
OstpoUtik to prevent Western Europe from becoming politically or, worse, militarily or,
worst of alK.thermonuclearly united and, in particular, to. prevent the Federal Rcpiablic
from becoming dominant in Western Europe, obtaining independent access to,nuclear
weapons, or otherwise greatly increasing its military strength. ; William E. GriiFith, The
OstpoUtik of the Federal Repidylic of Germany (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London,
England; The MIT Press, 1978), pp. 163-164:
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The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 gave increased impetus to Moscow to
reach some sort of settlement with the West which would legitimize Soviet rule in
Eastern Europe, possibly preventing the appearance of future Czechoslovakias. F'".
Stephen Larrabee adopts this line of thought:
As long as the West had not accepted the postwar status quo a threat to Soviet
hegemony existed, however latent. This consideration pointed, above all. to the
need for intensified efforts to achieve some sort of a settlement with Bonn, for it
had become increasingly, clear that the Federal Republic held the keys to the
solution of the outstaliding issues of European ^po
Oder-Neisse line and the acceptance of the uDR.
litics-the recognition of the
o'-
Given this situation, then why was there a two-year crisis between Ulbricht
and the Kremlin after the Soviet decision was made to respond to the overtures from
Willy Brandt and the West German leadership in 1969? The answers possibly lie in the
prerequisites demanded by the GDR leadership before normal relations could be
negotiated. These included:
1) Full unqualified recognition of GDR sovereignty.
2) An agreement by West Germany not to impede GDR pursuit of diplomatic
relations internationally.
3) The establishment of a permanent Four-Power status in Berlin with an avenue
for future control by the GDR.
4) The renunciation of any future special relations between the German nations.
These preconditions all embodied the insecurity traditionally experienced by the East
German government.
The subsequent West German-Soviet negotiations which began on January 30,
1970 forced the GDR to consent reluctantly to open its own dialogue with its western
counterpart. However, Ulbricht continued his opposition even after the signing of the
Soviet-West German Treaty in August. ^^ He became increasingly obstinate concerning
the compromise over GDR recognition and the Berlin quadripartite talks. As a result
of Soviet pressure, Ulbricht perceived three challenges to his regime during this time:
o -I
F. Stephen Larrabee, "Moscow and the German Question: Continuities and
Changes," Problems of Communism (March-April 1981), p. 69.
For a more detailed discussion of the Ulbricht opposition to detente see
Edwina Moreton, East Germanv and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics of Detente
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 1978); and William E. Griffith, The Osipolitik of
the federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England;
The MIT Press, 1978).
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1) An inherent danger to regime stability and legitimacy resulting from increased
inter-German dialogue and greater interaction between East and West
Germans.
2) The end to the chance of liquidating the Four-power status of Berlin which
would enable the "island" of the West to continue to exist as a direct challenge
to East German sovereignty.
3) The perception of Soviet manipulation which could result from a reversal of
traditional East German policies in relations with West Germany. This could
harm regime credibility from a sovereignty standpoint. Any evidence of real
autonomy would be completely discredited.
It is no coincidence that all three of these problems reflected legitimacy/stability
concerns.
The Ostpolitik dispute with the Kremlin seems inevitable when the particular
combination of legitimacy/ stability goals are analyzed in the matrix in Figure 4.1. The
matrix illustrates the L/S factors which were motivations for Ulbricht and the SED
leadership in the dispute, and it is evident that the GDR perceived all four L/S goals as
being affected by negotiating with the FRG:
1) The possibility of increased inter-German contacts served to detract from the
creation of a separate East German national identitv by potentially bridsing the
man-made cultural gap between the two countries' As new rela'tionslfips and
interactions on a personal level became possible, the SED perceived threats to
attaining national identity goals.
2) Sovereignty goals would be harmed because of the evidence of Soviet
manipulatibnln any.policv change to an environment of inter-German detente,
and tne continuing "island*' of West Berlin was anathema to Ulbricht in relation
to GDR sovereigntv. Increased Soviet trade with the FRG would decrease
GDR influence, lind closer ties could make reunification a remote, but real
possibility.
3) Ideploev goals were affected in that the status quo was to be recognized - a
policy "diametrically opposed to the past themes of East German prop^aganda.
4) Social goals would be affected by the increased ability of East German citizens
to compare their lot with their'' Western counterparts through the increased
contacts with relatives and friends from the West. Greater expectations could
arise which could not be realized in the near future.
When viewed from this perspective, the reasons for the Soviet-SED dispute then
become clearer.
The disagreement was finally settled by the Soviets. The direct result was the
ouster of Ulbricht in 1971 and the series of negotiations and treaties between the East
and West throughout the next few years. The watershed of these negotiations (for the










In GDR Foreign Policy
1. National Identity Goals include those goals which^
if attained- would contribute to the overall perception
of a separate East German national heritage and culture.
Policy Example: Policies aimed toward recognition
of GDR citizenship would serve to lend credence to the
East German "nation.
"
2. Sovereignty goals motivate policies which tend to
illustrate the GDR as a new and viable nation in the
international milieu.
Policy Example: The attempt to convincingly downplay
Soviet penetration and control enhances GDR autonomy and
hence sovereignty.
3. Ideology goals are met by advocating the inherent
"rightness of the East German social and political
system.
Policy Example: The policy of controlled emigration
and limited contact would serve to protect ideological
foundations.
4. Social goals encompass all those policies which
are aimed at maintaining popular support through economic
?rowth, standard of living, welfare, etc.
olicy Example: official help in increasing reception
of West German television broadcasts in the Eastern
portions of the GDR illustrate social goal motivations.
Figure 4.1 Soviet-GDR Dispute Over Ostpolitik.
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5. Abgrenzung
Walter Ulbricht's removal after the beginning of East-West detente brought
into play a second strategy along with a new leader, Erich Honecker. This strategy
was based upon the realization that there would not be a unified German entity.
Long-awaited international recognition for the GDR, as well as West German
recognition, served to underwrite the permanency of the division and legitimize the
East German regime.
As Erich Honecker took over the reins of power, East German frustrations
with the forced detente with the ERG were heightened by the realization that the
dramatic increases in East-West German contacts were becoming a reality for the first
time since 1961. The logical response on their part was the initiation of the policy of
Abgrenzung (delimitation). This policy was aimed at constantly monitoring the
influence of the West and minimizing its impact on East German L/S goals:
This entailed stepped-up ideological vigilance for party members, increased
military and ideological instrucnon in "the schools, as well as the sudden
categorization of more than one million <, East Germans as 'carriers of state
secrets' banned from any Western contacts.
In Abgrenzung the separateness of the two German nations was stressed and
the German question was considered closed by East Berlin. This produced what was to
color the inter-German negotiations for the remainder of the decade, namely, a series
of incremental steps with a tedious and tender approach to the GDR by the FRG (and
with the legitimacy/stability needs of East Germany always in mind). This was the
nature of the dialogue during the West German Social Democratic Party's (SPD's)
Deutschlandpolitik.^'^ West Germany could only hope to open inter-German dialogue
and keep the hope for reunification aUve by promoting stabihty in the GDR; for as
long as any perceived threats to the SED regime existed, negotiations would probably
remain elusive. West Germany attained this by making overtures and one-sided
concessions while, at the same time, attempting to gain some advantages for the FRG
(mainly in the forms of citizen contacts and emigration policy). West Germany's
^^ Ronald Asmus, "Bonn and East Berlin: The 'New' German Question?" Radio
Free Europe Research (RAD Report/20, 14 March 1985), p. 51.
^^For a discussion of the SPD's policy, see Walter Leisler Kiep, "The New
Deutschlandpolitik " Foreign Affairs (Winter 1984-1985), and Michael Sturmcr,
"Making Sense of Deutschlandpolitik," Ihe Washington Quarterly (V/'mier 1986).
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punishment policies of the pre-detente era hence gave way to positive reinforcement in
the guise of such programs as the "swing" credit fostered as an incentive to soften the
hard currency exchange requirements in East Berlin.
Applying the L/S matrix to the policy of Abgrenzung in Figure 4.2, it is
evident again that legitimacy and stability goals were paramount. Three of the four
L/S goals were in play:
1. National identity eoals were perceived as important because interaction between
East and West Germans could induence the societal barriers which had so
painstakinalv been constructed by the SED^ and subsequent policy was created
to de-empliasize an ^overall "Germanness ' in favor of a Prussian or East
German nationalism. The concerns mirrored in the dispute over Ostpoliiik
were addressed in Abgrenzung.
2. Motivations as a result of the pursuit of sovereigntv coals were not as
important. The international recognition given to th'e GDK by admission to
the United Nations, as well as the diplomatic homage paid bv the ERG (in
stark contrast with the past), could onlv aid in "this regard. Therefore,
sovercicnty would not be harmed, but actuallv helped if equal treatment and
diplomatic interaction continued as a result of closer contacts.
3. Ideological goals were motivations for delimitation because of the need to
minimize the desirable aspects of Western culture, which became accessible
through more open interaction. In addition, detente had made it more difficult
to chastise the FRG while simultaneously improving relations. The "rightness"
of VI arxism/ Leninism could be damaged \[ Abgrenzung was not upheld.
4. Social eoals were influenced because of the possible effect that inter-German
rapprocliement would have on the massive political socialization which had
been occurring in East Germany for years. The apparition of increased
contacts with %Vest Germans and consequent comparisons of life in the two
countries could spark consumer and political dissent similar to that before 1961.
There is a marked similarity to the concerns of the SED leadership in
Abgrenzung and the OstpoUtik dispute. Mowever, in Abgrenzung sovereignty goals were
not as important because diplomatic recognition and contacts did not appear to be
involved in Honecker's internal policy of delimitation. Consequently, sovereignty goals
were not pursued as energetically as national identity, ideology, and social goals.
The "swin§" is a permanent interest-free credit from West Germany to East
Germany as a result of the Berlin Agreement of 1951.
^^Into the mid-1970's Honecker was forced to intensify the creation of an East
German national identity. By 1976 signs of elite and mass discontent appeared as a
result of the Helsinki Filial Act which prompted more than one hundred thousand East
Germans to apply for emigration to West Germany. In addition, the regime's
deprivation of the 'balladccr Wolf Biermann's citizenship; the house arrest of dis'sidcnt
intellectual Robert Havemann; and the later deportation of many other prominent
dissidents contributed to the growing atmosphere of popular discontent. Combined
with the decreasing fear of the "regime by the population, tne SED was forced to justilV
its existence again because (at least in part) of Ostpoliiik. Although by the. end of
1976, when most public expressions of discontent had been quashed, it was evident to
Honecker that a greater sense of national identity must be created; thus, the emphasis
on German history and nationalism which best Tit the socialist and Prussian legacies
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Figure 4.2 The Abgrenzung (Delimitation) Policy.
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Abgrenzung has continued into the present with various levels of intensity and,
depending upon the nature of the East-West relationship, will remain a policy at the
disposal of the SED. Whenever the ties with West Germany seem to be negatively
affecting the domestic attitudes and opinions of the people, delimitation of
inter-German contact again sets in. However, Abgrenzung served its most important
role in the period immediately following detente.
6. Damage Limitation
By the end of the 1970's, there had evolved new East German attitudes toward
the FRG. West German ties had become a positive factor for political stability. It
was readily apparent that the SED had become more effective in dealing with its
citizens in an environment of inter-German ties. Although Abgrenzung continued,
expert control of the population through the security structure and sophisticated
handling of potential domestic problems (using the domestic implements described
earlier) contributed to the neutralization of any SED qualms in dealing with West
Germany. In addition, the regime's efforts at building a subtle consensus with its
population through a "Teutonic Ghoulash Communism" had become dependent upon
continued economic infusions from the West Germans. Lastly, detente had opened the
way for the viability of the GDR as an international actor. Therefore, East-West
detente had become an important part of Honecker's more self-confident and secure
regime.
Beginning in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Solidarity
movement in Poland, and the NATO dual-track discussions over INF heralded a
change in East-West relations. This was especially true as the GDR linked the future
of inter-German relations to the INF issue as part of the overall Soviet strategy. This
was partially justified by the Soviet Union (and the GDR) through existing treaties
between East and West. A Soviet article stated:
West Germany is committed under the Moscow Treaties to contribute in everv
way to the assertion of the principle of non-use of force and of renunciation oT
the threat of force in relations with eastern neighbors.
Roland Smith, "Soviet Policy Towards West Germany," Adelphi Papers,
number 203 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1985),
p. 24.
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In response, Helmut Kohl's new Christian Democrat and Free Democrat
(CDU/FDP) coalition which had come to power in 1982 continued the attempt to
disengage the INF issue by carrying on normal relations and actually increasing ties in
the economic realm. This was evidenced in June 1983 with the granting of a DM 1
billion banking credit by a West German bank consortium and guaranteed by the West
German government. This seemed to be an open sign from West Germany of the
desire to continue inter-German relations as before.
With the actual start of deployments in November 1983, U.S. -Soviet relations
reached a new low in the post-detente era. Arms control talks were broken off, but
inter-German relations continued to be unaffected. In a speech at the end of
November 1983, Erich Monecker introduced the policy of "damage limitation" relative
to relations with Bonn. Following this, in January 1984 Honccker expressed optimism
for future superpower arms control talks in an interview for the French communist
weekly Revolution, exhibiting a stance distinctly opposite that recently portrayed by
Moscow.^^ In addition, East Germany turned over the surface rapid transit system
(S-Bahn) in West Berlin to FRG administration on January 9 - a system which had
been under the control of East Berlin since World War II. The agreement was
perceived by the West as another landmark sign of East German desires for detente
despite East-West tensions over INF.^^ Therefore, as the Soviets continued to cool
relations with the West, it appeared that the East Germans were conducting business
as usual. In fact, at one point during this period, the GDR carried on fourteen
different forums with West Germany.^^ This was the beginning of a new diverging
direction vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
Following the publication of an article by Hungarian Matyas Szuros in
January 1984 (sympathetic to the East German position), a chain of media polemics
began in Eastern Europe which opened the discord to Western view. Hungarv', siding
oo
Ronald Asmus, "Rapprochement with Bonn," in Soviet/East European Survey,
1983-1984, ed. Vojtech Mastny (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 238.
^^Ronald Asmus, "The Dialectics of Detente and Discord: The Moscow-East
Berlin-Bonn Triangle," Orbis (Winter 1985), p. 749. Also see Ilonecker's interview in
Revolution, January 6, 1984.
"Berlin Subway Pact Has tkhocs of Detente," The Christian Science Monitor,
10 January 1984, International Section, p. 7.
^^ Ronald Asmus, "The Dialectics of Detente . . . .", p.748.
Ibid., p. 745. The Hungarian article was printed as "The Reciprocal EfTcct of
National and International Interests in the Development of Socialism in Hungary," by
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with the Honecker position, gently rebufTed the low-keyed berating from
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union over too much independent foreign policy. Thus
by the Spring of 1984 an evident dispute had arisen between the Soviets and the East
Germans over relations with Bonn in the wake of INF deployment. Ironically, in just
over ten years the new Soviet-East German dispute involved switched roles with the
same actors. Ronald Asmus describes the new characteristics as compared to
Ostpolitik:
In the late 1960's and early 1970's it was essentially Ulbricht and the East
German regime that were stressing the perils of West German "revanchism" and
arguing that any openins to the FRG not on Eastern terms — full de jure
diplomatic recognition oPEast Berlin by Bonn -- was frauaht with dangers for
domestic political stability and foreign policy credibilitv. In Moscow, "on the
other hand, the Soviet leaders, while certainly" concerned' about political stability
in the GDR. sometimes differed from the East German leadership, particularly
Ulbricht. in their view of the risks and costs of detente. Confronted with the
choice of supporting Ulbricht's maximalist demands or moving ahead with its
own efforts to reach compromises with Bonn that might enable it to achie\e one
of its most soucht after foreign policy goals of the postwar period. Western
recognition of tlie territorial status quo, Moscow chose to subordinate East
German demands to larger considerations.
The irony of history is that in 1984 the issues were essentially the same.
but with the roles reversed. It was now Moscow that was harpmg on the
dangers of West German "revanchism", bluntly reminding East Berlm of Bonn's
attempt to sain "levers of influence" through credits and other means and serving
notice that the West Germans had to be appropriately punished for their support
of INF deployment in order to protect the credibility' of Warsaw Pact diplomacy
.... In sharp contrast. East Berlin was soothingly iirging a "coalition of reason"'
betwe^ the two Germanics in order to "liixiit the 'damage" in East-West relations
The dispute was largely settled with the cancellation of the much-heralded visit
of Erich Honecker to the FRG in September 1984. It seems Moscow had tolerated
enough and the reins had been tightened once again. What were the goals at stake in
this new set of tensions between Moscow and East Berlin? Figure 4.3 illustrates the
L/S goals for the period of "damage limitation". Three of the four categories were
affected: sovereignty goals, ideological goals, and social goals:
1. National identity goals were less important as motivators because the continued
relationship with "West Germany could not really aid in separating the two
Germanics and their populations into two nations, to the contrary, it would
tend to bring them closer.
Matyas Szuros in Tarsadalmi Szemle (No. 1, January 1984}, pp. 13-21. It advocated
the adoption of more nationalist oriented policies in a radically refined perception of
bloc cooperation and interaction.
Ronald Asmus, "The Soviet-East German Dispute Revisited," Radio Free
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Figure 4.3 Soviet-GDR Discord Over Damage Limitation.
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1
2. Sovereignty coals were involved for the same reasons as in the Osipolitik
dispute, bast German relations with West Germany were in danser of hein^
controlled completely by Moscow, consequently undermining tlie regime s
legitimacy which had^ become intertwined witn continued spcciaPtics witlfWest
Germany. This became more important as the policy or "damage limitation"
sained lavor in Western countries and served to mcrease international prestige
for East Berlin.
3. Ideological goals were pursued for similar reasons as seen in the previous issues.
Although not unprecedented, an extreme change of policy direction would be
very drOicult to explain in terms of ideology, especially after the recent
turn-around in the early 1970's. Continuity "in inter-German relations had
shown itself to be an important element in this regard.
4. Social L/S goals were mainlv involved for special economic factors. The
increased financial ties with West Germany had become more important as
GDR consumers were required to experience austere measures in order for the
GDR to address the foreign debt problem, raw material shortages/high prices,
and energy difficulties. Ho'wever, "damage limitation" was also popular with the
East GeTman masses. This support %vas a potential domestic source of
legitimacy in the face of slowing rises in consumer standards of living; to many
East Germans, Honecker appeared as a leader who was doing his best for his
country.
"Damage limitation" served to preserve those factors which had brought
benefits to the SED regime because of the legitimizing and stabilizing nature of the
existing relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. To risk past progress toward
attainment of the legitimacy/ stability goals ran absolutely counter to the perceived
national interests of the GDR, and subsequently, motivated the resistance exhibited by
the SED regime vis-a-vis Moscow.
7. SDI: The New Issue?
As Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the post of CPSU leader in March 1985, East
Germany hoped that some degree of Soviet leadership stability would now take hold
and clear the ambiguity of policy toward Eastern Europe. The SED predicted
Gorbachev would ". . . restore energetic leadership .... and end the confusion that
overshadowed relations between Moscow and its key ally last year."^"^ Even at
Chernenko's funeral, Honecker continued pursuit of normal inter-German relations as
he and Helmut Kohl met for two hours in a guest house producing a joint
communique supporting improved East-West relations. But within ten days, another
change from pro-Western rhetoric was evident in a joint communique from East
German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey
Gromyko. This new restraint was directly related to the Soviet perception of possible
Renter Dispatch from East Berlin, March 12, 1985, which reported comments
of SED officials to Western. diplomats exhibiting, encouragement over the appointment
of Gorbachev- as quoted in Vladimir V. Kusin's article, "Gorbachev and Eastern
Europe," Problems oj Communism (January-February 1986), p. 47.
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Izvestya (Moscow), March 21, 1985.
65
West German participation in the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Although the Soviets encouraged Honecker to remain friendly with other Western
countries, upper level relations with Bonn were to be downplayed for the present, at
least until the Reagan-Gorbachev summit. It appeared that a new issue had come to
take the place of INF, and the same legitimacy/stability goals were undoubtedly at
play. In the future, discord of a higher level between Bonn and Moscow is again
possible, especially if SDI moves further along in research and development and closer
to deployment (with West German help). As of this writing, there are new plans for
Erich Honecker to visit the FRG. Whether or not the national interests of the East
Germans manifested in the L/S goals discussed in this chapter will again produce
frictions in Soviet-GDR relations is yet to be seen, but rest assured, inter-German
relations will indeed continue to be involved.
B. GDR-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS
1. East Germany's Role in Eastern Europe
Not only must the GDR exist within a foreign policy environment created, for
the most part, by its relationship with the Soviet Union, it must also interact with the
other countries of the Soviet sphere — the six countries of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization. Tied to these nations through common factors (e.g., Soviet power,
military commitments, Marxism/ Leninism, COMECON, geography, economic
realities). East Germany has become one of the most influential nations within the
"community of socialist states." However, as it continues its quest for legitimacy and
stability, interaction with these countries has not always been cordial; often,
differences have arisen and thinly veiled hostility has periodically become evident.
In discussing GDR relations with her "sister" nations behind the Iron Curtain,
it is helpful to outline the importance of these countries to the Soviet Union, because
the GDR aids in attaining Soviet goals in the region. John Van Oudenaren notes three
types of East European contributions to the Soviets:^^
1) Political- The Soviet bloc nations (East Germany. Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Hungarv, and Romania) provide a source of political power by
alloXving the Soviet Union to claim leadership of the international socialis't
"movement." 'i'his role aids in the international prestige of the USSR,
portraying it as a political world leader.
John Van Oudenaren, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Options for the
1980's and Beyond {Sania Monica, California: Rand Corporation, March 1984), p. v.
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2) Active- Eastern Europe is a ready source of technology, scientific knowledge,
military resources, economic resources, and diplomatic power for the Soviets.
"
3) Passive- The Warsaw Pact nations serve to insulate the Soviet Union firom the
West and, if required, enable military operations to take place fi'om non-Soviet
territories (important from the historical Russian legacy and paranoic mindset).
As the most loyal and helpful ally to the Soviet Union, the GDR has become
increasingly important as a source of leverage within Eastern Europe to help in
maintaining returns on Soviet investments.
First, East Germany:
. . . plays a central role in the ideolocical aspects of Moscow's Blokpolitik and
its ideological significance for the USSR has increased since the 1970's .... The
SED reinlorces the legitimacy of the Soviet system as one of the staunchest
supporters (together wtth Bulgaria) of Soviet ideological pronouncements except
at the end of the Ulbricht regime. It therefore performs an important function m
showing the correctness both of the domestic Soviet SA'.stem and of its ideological
claim to be the leading model for all its sociaUst allies.
Second, East Germany participates in Eastern Europe as a member of the
"common defense" and functions in overall Warsaw Pact miUtary planning. The
National People's Army (NVA) is one of the best equipped and trained of all of the
WTO nations; again, underscoring the role of East Germany as a significant junior
partner of the USSR.^^ The military nature of the WTO serves two functions (related
to the above three contributions). Robert Hutchings notes:
Somewhat paradoxically, the WTO's chief uses are political rather than purely
military: it provides 'a forum
.
for foreign policy coordination and the
announcement of joint policy intitiatives, aiid its vast apparatus serves as an
instrument for maintaining the stability and cohesion of the Soviet bloc.
Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the German Democratic Republic," in
Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, ed. S.M. Terry (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1984), p. 43.
In the late 1970's when the Soviets were increasing pressure on the East
European nations to increase defense spending, the GDR increased hers more than any
other member. Eor example. East German per capita military expenditures srcw from
S427 (constant 1982 dollars) in 1973 to S56J in 1983, an increase of over 31% and the
largest in the Warsaw Pact. The nation with the next largest increase was Bulearia
(S3^5 to S461; an increase of 19.7%). See World Miliiarv Expenditures and /Irnis
Transfers (Washincton, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, August,
1985), Table I, pp.^55-7S.
Robert L. Ilutchincs, "The Entangling Alliance: The Warsaw^ Pact on its
Twenty-fifth Anniversary," Radio Free Europe Research (RAD Background Report/ 108,
8 May 1980), p. 1; quoted in William Reisinger, "East European Military Expenditures
in the 1970 s: Collective Good or Bargaming Offer?" International Organization,
Volume 37, no. 1 (Winter 1983), p. 150.
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Third, the economic position of the GDR in the communist bloc creates no
little influence vis-a-vis the other COMECON members. East Germany and the Soviet
Union are the most important trading partners to each other (40% of total GDR trade
in the 1980's). Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary are, respectively. East Germany's
third, fourth, and fifth most important economic clients; accounting for over
one-fourth of the total East German trade. ^^° Bulgaria, Romania, and Cuba add
another 5 percent. ^^^ The economic relations with her Eastern neighbors also bring
political benefits to the GDR:
Indeed, the economic development of the GDR is closelv related to its
development as a "junior partner" of the, Soviets. This relationship has enhanced
the GDR's prestige in Eastern Europe .
Lastly, the location of the GDR on the "front hne" of communism provides
both strategic importance for the pact as well as influence through its ability to interact
with the West (both economically and politically).
Thus, for political-ideological, military, economic, and geographic reasons, the
GDR is a key element in the plans and policies of the Soviet bloc, serving both Soviet
and East German national interests:
Leading party officials of both the CPSU and the SED seem to view monolithic
bloc uitity as indispensable. The USSR sees the universal acceptance of its own
leading role at stake. The East Germans, on the other hand, regard the solidarity
of the Eastern camp as essential to compensate for(,J:heir "exposed and, in
comparison with the Federal Republic, inferior position.
The SED's influence in Eastern Europe has been seen only rarely as
autonomous policy; that is, autonomous vis-a-vis the USSR. These actions have
mirrored legitimacy and stability concerns. To demonstrate that L/S goals function in
East German foreign policymaking for Eastern Europe, I will concentrate on two
major crises in the Soviet bloc: the Czechoslovakian situation leading to the
^^"^The second major trading partner is the ERG.
C. Bradley Scharf, Politics and Change in Eastern Europe, p. 177.
^^^Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., "The German Democratic Republic, " in Teresa
Rakowska-IIarmstone, Communism in Eastern Europe (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1984), pp. 155-156.
^^^Gerhard Wettig, Community and Conflict In the Socialist Camp (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1974), p 136.
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Soviet-Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968 and the Polish crisis of 1980-81. These two cases
will be examined in the context of the legitimacy/stability matrix in order to verify that
legitimacy and stability goals did indeed act as policy determinants.
2. Czechoslovakia- 1968
In January 1968 first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS),
Antonin Novotny, was replaced by Alexander Dubcek, beginning what was to be called
the "Prague Spring." Promising liberalization and democratization of society, Novotny
introduced modest reforms while pledging loyalty to the USSR. Political life soon
awakened again in Czechoslovakia where communist and non-communist alike
participated in the public debate over continued reforms within Czech society.
The impact of this domestic upheaval upon Prague's foreign policy became
evident in February 1968 in Budapest where a communist consultative meeting was
held. This meeting revealed evidence of bloc disunity when the "hard-liners" (Soviets,
East Germans,and Poles) issued statements supporting the creation of legal, binding
documents to suppress the increasing nationaUst tendencies in the socialist camp. In
addition, these nations denounced the People's Republic of China for socialist
deviation. As a result of disagreement over this line of discussion, and criticism from
the Syrian delegate over her internal policies, Romania walked out of the meeting on
29 February. ^^^ Czechoslovakia openly supported these Romanian positions - a
complete turn-around from the strict adherence to bloc policy during the latest Middle
East war in 1967. But more importantly, the Czechs supported certain West German
positions on Ostpolitik, contributing to East German rhetoric which blamed the FRG
for "capitalist intervention" in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs.
Liberahsm in Czechoslovakia spread rapidly throughout the society, thereby
threatening the entire communist system. In March, Novotny was forced to relinquish
his remaining political office as head of state. Public expression of non-communist
This was a tactic introduced by Ilonecker in line with his belief that the CPSU
was the only true leader of world communism: see Mcinz Lippman, Honecker and ilie
New Politics of Europe (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), p. 205.
Romania had increasinglv become the maverick in the Soviet bloc since the
rernoval of Soviet troops in the"r950's. Bv the late 1960's. and after the Sino-Soviet
split, the Romanians possessed close tics \vith the PRC while, at the same time, they
limited
.
cooperation with the other communist states in Fiastern Europe. The
Romanians reduced their militan,' contributions -and prevented both exercises and troop
movements on their territory by Warsaw Pact forces. I'hev were not invited to
important meetings such as tho'se where militarv intervention could be discussed.
Therefore, any support by the Czechs for the Romanian position was an act of
"disloyalty" and, consequently, disconcerting to the Soviets.
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opinions increased throughout March and spread into Poland where students and
intellectuals cooperated in public demonstrations. ^^^ In response, on March 23 a
Warsaw Pact meeting was held in Dresden. In the course of the discussions Dubcek
gave assurances to all of the members present (Romania had not been invited) that any
reforms would not endanger Czechoslovakia's road to socialism. The Dresden meeting
was believed to be called at the insistence of Poland and the GDR:
This preference for a multilateral approach in dealing with Czechoslovakia could
be assumed to reflect the serious concern of UlbricHt and Gomulka, particularly
in view of,moves in Czechoslovakia, beginning in mid-March, to end press
censorship.
Lifting of the media ban significantly enhanced the role of the press,
television, and radio as they became "tools for democratization." The SED became
even more concerned, to say the least, as the GDR now was faced with dangerous
broadcasts from two bordering countries (Czechoslovakia and West Germany).
Increasingly severe criticism of the Soviet style of communism came to be
commonplace in the Czechoslovakian press.
The German Question became important almost from the outset of the
"Prague Spring" as the SED and the other Warsaw Pact countries placed blame for any
counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia squarely on the West Germans. Similarly, East
Germany stepped up its attacks on Czechoslovakia for any scmblence of pro-Western
orientation. Even after the communique issued during the Dresden meeting (which had
expressed bloc confidence in the Czechoslovak proletariat, s ability to protect
socialism), the East Germans continued criticism. In response, the Czechs issued
official protests to the East German government, especially emphasizing that the SED
should not possess a monopoly on policy with Bonn. East Germany by this time had
already taken unilateral actions by halting East German tourist trips to Czechoslovakia
and cancelling Czech-German newspaper subscriptions. ^° East Germany's fear of
liberalization in any form gradually manifested itself in her foreign policy.
Jclfrev Simon. Cohesion and Dissension in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1983), p. 43.
^ Edwina Moreton, East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance, p. 76.
See complete text in R.A. Remington, Winter in Prague (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MT.T. Press, 1969), pp. 55-57.
^^^Ibid., p. 75.
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The publication of the summary of the Czechoslovak "Action Program" on 5
April added fuel to the fire as new challenges to the communist status quo in Eastern
Europe became apparent. Titled Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism, it called for
greater autonomy in military and foreign affairs arenas, increased civil and personal
freedoms, and greater inclusion of non-communist entities in governmental affairs.^ ^^
At the beginning of May, Dubcek flew to Moscow for high level discussions
over both the reform situation and Czech requests for Soviet financial loans. At the
conclusion of this meeting, other WTO members, this time excluding both
Czechoslovakia and Romania, converged on Moscow. From this time on (after II
May) an escalatory press campaign against Czechoslovakia was unleashed by the
Soviet Union, East Germany, and Poland. East Germany ranted over the Berlin issue
and accused West Germans and Americans of smuggling troops into Czechoslovakia.
It was in May, also, that a secret memorandum had been circulated within the SED
calling for armed intervention.^ ^^
After on-again, off-again criticism from the Warsaw Pact media, the famous
"2000 words manifesto" was published on June 27 in a Czech newspaper calling for
even greater reform and signed by 70 prominent citizens. Soviet and East German
suspicions increased dramatically as a result.
In July another multilateral conference convened in Warsaw where Ulbricht
was also instrumental in issuing an ultimatum to Dubcek in the "Warsaw Letter."
The Czechs themselves were blamed for the counterrevolutionary tendencies in their
country and were compared to leaders in Hungary in 1956. Clearly, this was a warning
to Dubcek. By 1 August, however, in a meeting at Cierna nad Tisou on the
Soviet-Czech border, an agreement was reached with the Soviets and ratified at
Bratislava on 3 August by the six involved members of the WTO. It seemed for the
time-being that the crisis had subsided.
The event which apparently pushed the Soviets to invade occurred on 10
August when the Czechoslovak draft party statutes were published. If adopted in
September by the upcoming CPCS Party Congress, the sacrosanct principle of
Jeffrey Simon, Cohesion and Dissension in Eastern Europe, p. 43.
See F. Fejto, "Moscow and Its Allies," Problems of Communism
(November-December 1968), p. 36.
Jiri Valenta Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 196S: Anatomy of a Decision
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 55.
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democratic centralism was to be discarded. Before this could occur, the Warsaw Pact
invaded on 20 August with East German troops actively involved (the first and only
time East German soldiers have been used outside of the GDR in bona fide mihtary
operations). ^^-^ Edwina Moreton notably discusses the East German pressures on the
Soviets which contributed to this final invasion:
The. decision to invade was the final outcome of a series of pressures on the
Soviet leaders. Their immediate concern, however, was to preserve the leading
role of a Moscow-oriented communist party withm Czechoslovakia. This had
been clearlv. expressed in the Warsaw ultimatum to Dubcck, and corresponded,
too, to the" interests of Poland and East Germany. This concern over domestic
deyeloprnents was obviously also linked with concern for the possible spill-over
elTect of the reform movement both within the Soviet Union and withm other
East European States, particularly Poland. The two principal factors infiuencmg
the Soviet assessment of the situation appeared to be the freedom of debate
following the de facto abolition, xif censorship and proposal to modify the
principle of democratic centralism.
The actual influence of Ulbricht on the final Soviet decision to invade was
greater than any other Soviet ally; however, the total impact of his stance was
probably limited. iVIore importantly, his urgings contributed to the "interventionist"
faction in the Soviet policymaking arena.' ^^ David Childs summarizes Ulbricht's
concerns:
There was speculation at the time that Walter Ulbricht had plaved a major role
in the decision to invade Czccholovakia. He ccrtainlv saw the "Prague Spring" as
a threat to himself and possiblv the SED. Even before Dubcck took. over, the
SED had had its eye on revisionist circles" in Pracue. About half a million East
Germans went for their holidays in Czechoslovakia in 1968; the fear was that
they would be infected by the Prague virus. Certainly Ulbricht could talk to the
Mo'scow leaders as one^ who had a wealth of expVience in the Communist
movement and as the head of an important member of the Warsaw Pact. But
Moscow knew of Ulbricht's weaknesses, a.s well as his strengths and it is unlikely,
therefore, that his opinion was decisive.
Although there were onlv two East German divisions engaged in rural areas,
their use prove'3 to the world tTiat the WA could (and was willing to) be used
elfectively in a foreign country.
''"^Edwina Moreton, East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance, pp. 78-79.
For an excellent discussion of the decisionmaking process resulting in the
military intervention in Czechoslovakia, see Jiri Valenta, Anatomy of a Decision.
David Childs, The GDR: Moscow's German Ally (London: George Allin and
Unwin, 1983), p. 79.
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According to Jiri Valenta, Ulbricht may have believed that a military intervention
could delay or stop a Soviet-West German rapprochement which became evident in
Brandt's Ostpolink of the mid-1960's.^^^
Whether or not Ulbricht and the SED influenced the Soviets to intervene in
Czechoslovakia is not as important as the hostile nature of their foreign policy posture
vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia and the West. The future stability and legitimacy of the
regime seemed to be precariously linked with the Czech system — a system which
recently had been so similar to that in the GDR.
Again, the East German attitudes toward the situation leading up to the
Soviet invasion can also be explained through legitimacy/stability goals, (see Figure
4.4):
1. National identitv goals were influential in motivating East German policies
toward Czechoslovakia. The appearance of CzechosFovakia's preference for
greater liberalization and hence closer ties with the West in general, and the
FRG in particular, could only place doubts into the minds of East German
citizens aoout the nature of the East German "nation." Access to Western
media enabled the average East German to view a similar communist counti-v
struggling to become increasingly Western in its attitude -- an attitude which
grew'ever closer to West Gcr'man values and which, therefore, created the
perception that the German nation in the West misht be the most credible of
the two. After all, if the Czechs who had been sucTi loyal socialists were now
turning to the West Germans to aid in solving their" problems, how could
Germans in the GDR ignore the other Deutschlan'cP.
2. Sovereignty goals motivated East German actions mainlv through the perceived
danger, that West Germany could undermine the GDR's position as the
recognized German state in the Soviet bloc. At this time. Eastern Europe was
the only international environment in which the GDR was regarded legally and
diplomatically as a true nation-state. Any appearance of East ^GeVman
inlluence in the final policies undertaken in Czechoslovakia served to
demonstrate that the GDR was a nation which could alTect the politics of the
powerlul Warsaw Pact. One way to attain this was to appear even more
reactionary than the Soviets in the hope that East German opinions would be
evident in ultimate pact policv (apart from the real concerns the SED had for
the spreading liberalism). At the same time, any permanent reform in
Czechoslovakia could bring a leadership to power that would be more
svmpathetic to Bonn, further isolating the GDR in the world and confirming
the overall international view that West Germany was the only credible German
state.
3. Dangers to ideological goals were probably one of the paramount concerns of
Ulbricht and the other "SED leadership. East Germans could see from Czech
and West German media that Marxism- Leninism was failing in a fraternal
socialist state. This could set a very dangerous precedent, esp^ecially since the
legitimacy problems of the GDR regime existed at two levels: the government
and the state (unlike Czechoslovakia" which was confronted with an'illegitimate
government only). The contagion of the reforms evident in the "Praguc\Spring"
was perhaps the greatest threal to the East German regime, providing the major
impetus for Ulbncht's interventionist pleadings, 'fhis danger was "made even
more credible with the Polish unrest in March 1968. The traditionally paranoid
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1. National Identity Coals include those goals which^
if attained, would contribute to the overall perception
of a separate East German national heritage and culture.
Policy Example: Policies aimed toward recognition
of GDR citizenship would serve to lend credence to the
East German "nation.
"
2. Sovereignty goals motivate policies which tend to
illustrate the GDR as a new and viable nation in the
international milieu.
Policy Example: The attempt to convincingly downplay
Soviet penetration and control enhances GDR autonomy and
hence sovereignty.
3. Ideology goals are met by advocating the inherent
"rightness of the East German social and political
system.
Policy Example: The policy of controlled emigration
and limited contact would serve to protect ideological
foundations.
4. Social goals encompass all those policies which
are aimed at maintaining popular support through economic
growth, standard of living, welfare, etc.
Policy Example: official help in increasing reception
of West German television broadcasts in the Eastern
portions of the GDR illustrate social goal motivations.
Figure 4.4 East German Motivations in Czechoslovakia: 1968.
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SED could not tolerate the thought of a successful democratization of a
socialist neishbor; the result could most assuredly become a
counterrevolutlonarv epidemic destabilizing the teeterine level of legitimacy for
the SED.
4. Social policv was also affected because of the loss of trade that could occur if
Czechoslovakia turned to the West for her economic health. As mentioned
before, Czechoslovakia was the third largest trading partner for East Germanv.
but more importantly, this trade, .exceeded the "total trade with all other
non-Soviet COMECON countries. In addition, closer Czech ties with the
FRG as a result of the liberal poUcics could possibly take away from GDR
trade with Bonn. These inter-bloc and extra-bloc economic possibilities could
negatively affect the East German economy, consumer satisfaction, and hence
domestic'legitimacy and stability.
Given these concerns by the SED leadership, it seems extremely plausible that
Ulbricht would apply considerable pressure upon the Soviets to militarily intervene in
Czechoslovakia to reestablish the former state of affairs to protect the communist
status quo in Eastern Europe.
3. Poland 1980-81
In the summer of 1980, it became evident that the economic policies of
Edward Gierek, the head of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), and his
toleration for political dissent combined to endanger the stability of the Polish
government. Mowever, the Soviet leadership considered Gierek an old and trusted
leader. They tended to do anything possible to keep him in power, even after warnings
from the Soviet ambassador to Poland and other internal sources reported a very
unstable situation. There had been periodic strikes in July because of the rise in meat
and meat-product prices, and in August, a giant sit-down strike occurred at the Lenin
shipyards at Gdansk, the site of a violent confrontation in the workers' riots of
1970.^ Over the next few weeks and months, workers, students, and intellectuals
united in demanding genuine trade unions, the right to strike, higher wages, lower
staple prices, and other economic concessions from the government. From this initial
unrest, the demands grew to include a general liberalization of the regime including the
lifting of press censorship, increased civil liberties, and the release of political prisoners
I 1 o
Peter Ludz, The German Democratic Republic from the Sixties to the Seventies
(New York: AMS Press, 1970), p. 73.
The 1970 riots were also triggered by increased prices of meat (as well as
vodka) and served to topple the Polish" fcaderslVrp under Wladyslaw Gomulka. Andrzci
Korbonski argues that ... . the overthrow of Gromulka in December 1970. represented
not only a crisis of lesitimacy and penetration but also a crisis of participation, and
that in this respect it illustrated rather well the notion of mass politicization leading to
social, frustration, and political instability because of the absence of channels "for
meaningful participation." See Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland", in Communism in Eastern
Europe, edited by Teresa Rakowska-IIarmstone, p. 55.
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(as in Czechoslovakia- 1968). By September, many of these requests had ^been
addressed, or at least acted upon in a positive way.
The new free labor trade union, Solidarity, soon became the leading voice in
the battle for Uberalization and encompassed over nine million members within the
following months, while the communist party and trade unions lost membership. ^^°
Protests and work stoppages continued in the wake of the government concessions and
Gierek was himself dismissed in September. His successor, Stanislaw Kania, was faced
with an economic reform movement which now possessed a political momentum. This
in itself could easily cause a repeat performance of the Czechoslovak invasion of 1968.
However, because of the size of the PoUsh population, the historical legacy of Polish
armed resistance, and the economic costs of a possible Soviet occupation of the
country (especially in the wake of the Afghanistan imbroglio), Soviet intervention was
unlikely if any possibihty of a peaceful solution to the situation remained (but Soviet
intentions were not readily apparent to the West at this time). Throughout the rest of
the year, Kania was faced with growing hostility from the Kremlin, through the press
and diplomatic pressure behind the scenes. In addition, the Soviets increased military
activity near Poland's borders, Kania found himself wedged between the Soviet Union
and Solidarity.
East Germany's main response to the labor unrest in Poland in the fall of
1980 was a reassertion of control on the domestic front, a press campaign against
Polish liberalism, and an increased demarcation (an emphasized return to Abgrenzung).
Arthur Hanhardt noted in a contemporary article:
The events in neighboring Poland were weishtv in the decision to pursue GDR
demarcation policies with greater vigor, lilcments of the "Polish disease" are
present in the GDR: there arc upward pressures on domestic prices held
artificially low bv Sl:D policy, along with internal dissent and dissatisfaction.
Moreover, the SED is in the position of having to worr\' about two "j'ronts." The
dangers from, .Western influence are compounded bv possible infection from the
Polish East.^^^
^^^Adam Ulam, Dangerous Relations (New York and Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1983), p. 279. ' *
^
^^^Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., "The Germanvs and the Superpowers: A Return to
Cold War?" Current History (April 198 1), pp. 148, 179.
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The strikes and demonstrations in July and August were initially ignored in
the East German press; the media were not sure how to tactically express the situation
in Poland when the citizenry could see or hear the events on Western news programs.
Also, since it was not ideologically possible to have strikes in sociaHst countries, there
developed another dilemma in the attempt to explain the Polish situation. Not until
August 27 did the East Germans provide any news to its population, which appeared
as a reprint of a Tass article in Neues Deutschland. This article accused foreign
interventionists for the PoUsh delemma, somewhat similar to the rhetoric during the
"Prague Spring."
The ouster of Gierek under implications of high level corruption, combined
with Western hints of similar circumstances in the GDR leadership, threatened the
image of the SED and, more importantly, increased the paranoia in the Party. Pohsh
demands for independent labor unions were countered by the East German regime as
anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary because the Solidarity movement was a direct
threat to SED labor unions and hence the regime. Not surprisingly, the East German
government sided with the Soviets.
Internal control of the population was tightened:
EAST BERLIN, Oct. 28: East Germany today announced severe restrictions on
travel to and from Poland in a move that followed this country's cutback of
communications with West Germany and virtually sc^ed 1 / miUion East
Germans olf from their neighbors to both East and West.
Just two weeks prior to this crackdown on travel to the east, the GDR had drastically
raised the amount of currency that Western visitors to the GDR were required to
exchange. Customs controls were also tightened along the Polish-GDR border to
further discourage Polish travel to East Germany and vice versa. In November, rail
traffic between the two countries was curtailed following East German press attacks on
Lech Walesa, the PoUsh labor leader.^^^ Thus, the conflagration sweeping Poland
reemphasized the SED's traditional problems: the absence of legitimacy at home as
highlighted by events abroad in a similar socialist system. After all. East Germany had
1 'y'y
"East Germany to Limit Travel Across Polish Borders," The New York Times,
1 7 ^
"East Germans Curtail Rail Traffic to Poland and Demand Loyalty," The New
October 29, 1980, p. ATI
_ _
York Times, November 27, 1980, p. 11
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a difTicult enough time limiting the liberalizing influences from the West without
worrying about threats from the socialist "family."
In other actions, the SED publicly echoed the Soviet line of criticism in
regards to Poland and exploited domestic anti-Polish prejudices to camouflage the cost
of possible losses in raw material and economic aid. The latter could occur if the
Soviets were forced to bolster the Polish economy. ^^"^ These prejudices were indeed real
as evidenced by the relief many East German citizens exhibited after the travel
restrictions were issued — relief resulting from resentment over shopping sprees by
Polish tourists in East German stores (which had become commonplace before the
labor strikes at Gdansk). ^^ Although these prejudices were on the SED's side, the
regime continued to display concern over the events in Poland.
In December, East Germany made threatening moves on the border with
Poland by restricting troops to garrisons and towns, cancelling leaves, and introducing
alert conditions. ^^^ As the tension in Poland continued into the new year, East
Germany began issuing large numbers of exit permits to unwanted individuals:
It sent home some 22,000 Polish guest workers emploved in East Germany,
including one group of technic^ns who, it was reported, had attempted to
establish a branch of Solidarity.
Polish artists seen with Solidarity badges were expelled and increased measures were
taken against any type of anti-socialist behavior or counterrevolutionary activity. This
illustrated the fears of the SED that potential unrest in the GDR was never far under
the surface, even in the midst of traditional biases against the Poles.
In Februai7 1981, Kania met with Honecker in East Berlin where agreements
of "fundamental and far-reaching significance" were supposedly concluded. Honecker
reiterated "solidarity with the Polish comrades in their striving to strengthen socialism
1 74
East Germany also suffered from the falling Polish coal production and
declining Polish exports resulting irom the strikes.
^^•^Vlichael MacQueen, "Polish-East German Tourism: A Thwarted End to a
Hopeful Experiment," Radio Free Europe Research (RAD Background Report,! 69, 11
July 1980).
East Germany Restricting Troops," The New York Times, December 16, 1980,
p. 14.
Jan B. Weydenthal, Bruce D. Porter, and Kevin Devlin, The Polish Drama:
J 980- 1 982 {Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 157.
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and the party in order to bring the country out of the crisis-ridden situation.' For
the next few months the SED railed against counterrevolutionary forces in Poland as
Solidarity continued to build support. A Der Spiegel report in April reported:
The SED leadership as before suggests hard action to end the crisis in Poland.
Party chief Erich Honecker said in rebruaiy: "The experience of the GDR with
counterrevolutionaries shows that one must act not merely politically but also
mihtarilv." ... At the Moscow summit meeting of the East bloc on 5"December
1980 I-fonecker had suggested a CLuick Soviet intervention in Poland. The
chairman of the GDR State Council made another attempt, 4p late March to
prompt the Polish Communist Party leadership to take action.
The most serious reaction to the Pohsh crisis in 1981 was the series of military
preparations begun in September: mobilization of reserves and militia {Kampfgnippen),
concentration of railway resources for troop transport, and establishment of possible
new units. This must have placed greater pressure on the Kania government to stop
the further erosion of the authority of the party.
Therefore, by the time martial law was imposed in Poland during December
1981, the GDR had undertaken a series of steps to reduce the spread of the "Polish
Virus" into East Germany since August 1980. These are summarized below:
1. Initial silence was maintained to coordinate and develop a media strategy
vis-a-vis information from the West.
2. Blame was then placed on "foreign interventionists" as the cause of the
anti-sociahst events occurring in Poland.
3. The policy of demarcation {Abgrenzung) was reemphasized through reformed
currency requirements used to reduce contacts from West Germany."
4. Travel restrictions, curtailment of rail traffic, and customs controls were
implemented on the Polish border to limit "infection" from the East.
5. Press attacks were stepped up against Eech Walesa and the Solidarity
movement to discredit them as unpatriotic and troublemakers duped by
capitalist forces.
6. The historical anti-Polish biases of the East German people were exploited to
limit what liberal ideas might reach the population. This tended to brand any
anti-socialist behavior as manifested in Poland as PoUsh, not East German, and
therefore undesirable.
7. In. December 1980, troops were restricted to garrisons which served to
intimidate the Kania regime.
8. Large numbers of Polish citizens, artists, and visitors in the GDR were deported
or persuaded to leave in order to reduce their contact with East German
citizens.
^'^^Neues Deutschland, 22 February 1981, p. 2, in FBIS (Eastern Europe), 25
February 1981, p. E 3.
129Der Spiegel, 13 April 1981, p. 14, in FBIS (Eastern Europe), 13 April 1981.
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9. Internal suppression of ^ny signs of dissent and counterrevolutionary activity
was stepped up.
10. An ideology of "social harmony" was propagated by courtins the SED partv
airiliated trade unions and increased non-SLD''party activities. This was used to
"move the people closer" to the state and, prove to the average East German
that his interests were being looked after.
11. Lastly, in the months before the declaration of martial law. hints of military
action as seen in the extensive preparation? in September 1981 placed further
pressure on the Kania regime to solve its problems.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the L/S goals which were active in the East German
reactions to the Polish crisis. These motivations seem to be very similar to those at
work in the Czechoslovakian crisis twelve years earlier:
1. National identity goals .were important in determining East German actions
toward Poland. As in Czechoslovakia. Western media were showing
information sooner than East German media. Consequently, another socialist
ally was portrayed as moving closer to the West. Thfs discredited East
Germany vis-a-vis the FRG. m response, the return to Ahgrenzung served to
reempha'size differences between the two Germanics in addition to insulating the
public from liberal ideas. UnolFicial concentration on the theme of Polish
inferiority indicated the superior nature of East Germany, underscoring a sense
of pride m being a GDR citizen.
2. There was little or no pressure placed upon the Soviet leadership to militarily
intervene in Poland (at least of the same level as 1968). However. East German
actions seemed to be derived from concerns for possible damage to GDR
sovereignty. These policies were seen in SED statements accusing Ihe West of
intervening in Polish internal afiairs. stressing the "rightness" of socialism (the
GDR) by discrediting capitalism (the FRG). All "actions appeared to be
independent, therefore maintaining, and possibly enhancing. East German
autonomy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
3. Motivation of policy due to pursuit of ideological goals was probably the most
important factor in this crisis. Acain. Marxism-Leninism seemed to 5e faltering
in a similar socialist countr}'. Tlie "Polish Virus" was a local danger to the
GDR regime whose attempts to insulate East German citizens were aimed at
preventing the contagion from spreading. Events were occuring in Poland
which, according to communist dogma, were not supposed to happen; strikes
were commonplace and the centraFauthority of the PUWP was disappearing.
Most of the F:ast German policies during the Polish crisis were in reaction to
dangers threatening the ideological foundations of SED rule.
4. Social goals were not as important as in the Czechoslovak crisis. Although
Poland was the fourth largest tradinc partner of East Germany, the other L'^S
goals seemed to take precedence. InTact. the apparent popular support for the
closing of the border with Poland (which prevented Polish tourists from
depleting relatively well-stocked stores in the GDR) would appear to have
improved consumer welfare by eliminating a cause of shortages in certain areas.
However, the loss of energy and raw materials would have balanced anv
positive gains in that respect, as did the West German currency requirement's
which cut down on the number of visitors from the West. Overall social
goals were not adversely alFected nor did they go far in motivating East German
actions relative to Poland.
^^^See La Figaro, 31 October 1 98 1, p. 3, in FDIS (Eastern Europe), 4 November
1981, p. E 5.
West Germans were regular sources of Western gifts and hard currency for









In GDR Foreign Policy
1. National Identity Goals include those goals which^
if attained, would contribute to the overall perception
of a separate East German national heritage and culture.
Policy Example: Policies aimed toward recognition
of GDR citizenship would serve to lend credence to the
East German "nation. "
2. Sovereignty goals motivate policies which tend to
illustrate the GDR as a new and viable nation in the
international milieu.
Policy Example: The attempt to convincingly downplay
Soviet penetration and control enhances GDR autonomy and
hence sovereignty.
3. Ideology goals are met by advocating the inherent
"rightness of the East German social and political
system.
Policy Example: The policy of controlled emigration
and limited contact would serve to protect ideological
foundations.
4. Social goals encompass all those policies which
are aimed at maintaining popular support through economic
growth, standard of living, welfare, etc.
Policy Example: official help in increasing reception
of West German television broadcasts in the Eastern
portions of the GDR illustrate social goal motivations.
Figure 4.5 The GDR and the Polish Crisis: 1980-81.
81
If this analysis holds true, then the matrix again indicates that East German
foreign policy reactions to the Solidarity movement in Poland were indeed influenced
by legitimacy and stability concerns. The temporary instability created when policies
were implemented — policies such as more restricted freedoms and movement of East
German citizens — were accomplished to maintain what gains in domestic legitimacy
the SED had, to date, attained.
C. THE GDR IN THE THIRD WORLD
East Germany possesses extensive ties with a number of countries of the Third
World. At times there have been over 22 individual states outside Europe considered
East German clients — chents such as Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South
Yemen, India, Syria, and Brazil. Other relationships in the Third World have included
(or presently include) Namibia, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Iraq, Libya, Nigeria,
Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau, and, possibly, Nicaragua. During the Grenada invasion in
1983, documents linking the SED with technical and miUtar\' assistance in that nation
were captured, and East German weapons, military advisors, and equipment have
been recently reported in Kampuchea.
The GDR's presence in these countries is largely explained as a part of the
"international division of labor" inherent in the Soviet bloc, and East Germany's
actions have closely followed Soviet initiatives in this regard. Melvin Croan writes:
East German activities have been closely tailored to the needs of Soviet policy, of
which thev must be regarded an integral part. Indeed, the GDR's substantial
presence on the AfricarT continent todav would be alLbut inconceivable without
the Kremlin's prior approval, if not, explicit direction.
In the case of Third World involvement then, East German policies mirror Soviet
policies. There are at least four reasons why the GDR adopts this Soviet position in
the Third World:
.Iiri Valenta and Herbert Ellison, chairmen, SovietjCuhan Siratc":y in the Third
World After Grenada: Toward the Prevention of Future Grenadas (Washington,^ D.C.:
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and U.S. Naval Postcraduate School,
August 1984).
"Khmer Rebels Say East Germans Aid Vietnamese," Christian Science
Monitor, 5 March 1984, p. 2.
Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" The Washington Quarterly 3 (Winter
1980), pp. 21-22.
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1. This posture reinforces tiie importance of the SED to the Kremlin as a valuable
ally, thus providing greater flexibilitv in other pohcymaking environments
vis-a-vis the Soviet^bnion (i.e., inter-'Gcrman relations, trade, and economic
policies).
2. Third World involvement increases the international legitimacy (and hence
domestic legitimacy) of the GDR.
3. These relations enable the GDR to compete with West German influence in the
international arena, emphasizing East German national identity.
4. Lastly, these policies allow greater access to economic benefits since the Third
World provides sources of raw materials and markets for East German goods,
aiding in satisfying consumer demands in the GDR.
Therefore, the GDR is a willing participant in the developing world for reasons of its
own, and legitimacy and stability influence these special interests.
After international recognition of the GDR in the early 1970's and the realization
of the need to limit Western influence following detente, massive integration of foreign
policies with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states occurred. This
served to limit further sacrifices of SED interests in the pursuit of closer relations with
the West:
With the. partial reopening of the "national question," the SED sousht
psychological reassurance through renewed refuge in Moscow-centered "socialist
internationalism," which had lo'ng served its ranking elite as a kind of ersatz
patriotism.
At the same time, detente provided more flexibility for the SED in foreign policy
because of the growth of official activities resulting from diplomatic recognition (thus
aiding in the realization of closer contacts with the developing countries of the world).
Therefore, as East Germany played the part of a Soviet proxy in the Third World,
increased opportunities to satisfy its own legitimacy and stability needs also became
apparent, providing another means to solidify SED control and prestige. Interactions
with countries in South America, the Middle East, and especially Africa continue to
enable the regime to gain some benefits in this regard.
1. Roles
East German roles in the Third World can be divided into four major areas:
military, economic, ideological, and diplomatic. Militarily, the East Germans provide
both equipment and personnel, and, in the case of Africa, are second only to Cuba in




estimated 2,500 to 4,500 military personnel operating in approximately a dozen
countries with over 1500 in Africa alone - a new "Red Afrika Korps" (see Table 3). In
the early 1980's the GDR was spending an estimated S20 million annually in military
aid to the Third World. ^-^^ The GDR has also built upon its reputation for efficiency in
organizing and training security forces and has taken advantage of this to gain
influence with leaders of emerging countries. This East German security expertise is
utilized extensively in countries such as South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and
Libya. In other military assistance programs, East German cadres reportedly assisted
troops in the Ethiopian civil war, and the NVA constructed military airfields in
Tanzania; training faciUties in India; provided trained coinmunication personnel in
Laos, Nigeria, Libya, and Angola; and trained guerrillas in Mozambique (and within
the GDR itself). Some sources blame the East Germans for the invasion of Zaire's
Shaba province in May 1978, which caused international excitement.
Economically, the GDR is interested in the Third world for rich sources of oil,
raw materials, and markets for its growing consumer economy. It spends upwards of
S300 million annually in economic assistance in these developing countries to keep
trade open. Sales of East German machinery, fertilizers, chemicals, and vehicles
sometimes often produce a positive trade balance and provide sources of hard currency.
Consequently, the SED leadership identifies potential trading partners based upon: (1)
political stability of the particular government; (2) the client's need for production
technology and transportation; (3) its existence as a strong source of food, raw
materials, and other goods needed in the GDR; (4) its capability to absorb East
German products; and (5) a demonstrated independence from the West.
Ideologically, the GDR trains party cadres, hbcration groups, intelligence
services, and secret police in these countries in order to further the "progress of
socialism." By backing such groups as the MPLA, the PLO, or SWAPO, the regime
can claim participation in the "liberation of the world from capitalism," thereby
Cited in "Ilonccker Cementing Aid and Technology Ties On 4-Nation Trip,"
The Christian Science Monitor, 22 February 1979, p. 6.
^^"^Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the GDR," p. 48.
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EAST GERMAN MILITARY IN THE THIRD WORLD
COUl^TRY
79-80 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86
Angola 1500 800 450 450 500 500
Ethiopia - R 250 550 550 550
PDRY - 100 325 75 75 75
Mozambique - R 100 100 100 100
Iraq - - 160 160 160 160
Libya - 1600 400 400 400 400
Algeria - R 250 250 250 250
Guinea - - 125 125 125 125
Syria - R 210 210 210 210
Totals 1500 2500 2270 2320 2370 2370
R= Reported, exact numbers unknown.
SOURCE:
The Military Balance 1985-1986 (London:
International Institute for Strategic iStudies, 1986).
heralding the righteousness of the GDR over the "neo-colonialism and racism" of the
FRO on an international level. As the most important region of East German
influence:
Africa has come to be regarded as an exceptionally promisin? arena in which to
pursue both East Germany's rivalry' with West Germany and its "delimitation"
from the FRG, toward the' greater goal of fostering a better sense of the GDR's
distinctive political identit}^ within East Germany itself.. The latter concern
informs the GDR's presentation of itself to Alrica and also figures centraHv in
domestic propaganda conccrnins th^ GDR's African engagement. Both seek to
portray the GD'R as the embodiment of a dineren,t,qbetfcr" Germany that comes
to Africa with unsullied hands and seliless motives.
139Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" p. 33.
85
The Third World relationship provides yet another forum for SED claims to
international legitimacy through diplomatic means. For instance, between 1977 and
1979 at least nine official visits by key East German leaders to African client states
occurred. These diplomatic sojourns served to underscore the importance of the GDR
in the developing world (from the perspective of the average East German). Taking
advantage of traditional respect for Germans in these countries (especially in those
areas historically affected by German efficiency), the SED actually seems to have
surpassed West Germany in Third World influence in Africa. This also provides
another tool to support SED claims as the inheritor of the German nation and German
histor}'.
2. Legitimacy/Stability Motivations
The roles discussed above mirror the legitimacy/stability concerns of the SED
regime and foster policies in the Third World which address these. Motivations are
summarized below (see Figure 4.6):
1. National identity goals are served by greater involvement in Third World
countries because of the increased opportunities to outperform the West
Germans in assisting in the development of these nations. In addition, East
Germany, can claim continuity as the "real" Germany by utilizing historical
German"^ iniluence in these regions to demonstrate an Ea'st German national
identity.
2. Sovereignty goals are pursued through the increased sense of international
legitimacy which, in turn, influences domestic leeitimacy in the GDR. The
emphasis placed upon the diplomatic exchanges and travel of high level ofTicials
to these countries raises SED prestige in the eyes of its subjects. Sovereignty is
expanded and East Germans can take pride in the international missions'of the
GDR.
3. Ideological motivations are again a result of the SED's political inferiority
complex. The East German activity in the Third World points toward the
"fullillment of a universal historical mission of chiliastic proportions.' Anv
East German successes in the Third World can only result in increased
credibility for Marxism- Leninism and hence the SED regime.
4. Lastly, economic considerations add impetus to East German moves in other
parts of the world. The needs for raw materials, oil, new markets, and hard
currency (especially in the wake of price rises and shortages from Soviet
sources) must be influential in anv cost/beneflt analysis earned out by the
regime. New avenues to satisfy the growing demands of the East Ge'rman
consumer are evident in the developing world." Ironically, the GDR has shown
itself to be the real inheritor of the old. German colonialism (rather than the
FRG) as it seeks new markets to exploit outside the Soviet bloc in order to
attain social policy goals.
The matrix once again identifies all four L/S goals as factors in continued
GDR contacts in the Third World. .Mthough East German policies are closely










In GDR Foreign Policy
1. National Identity Coals include those goals which<
if attained, would contribute to the overall perception
of a separate East German national heritage and culture.
Policy Example: Policies aimed toward recognition
of GDR citizenship would serve to lend credence to the
East German "nation."
2. Sovereignty goals motivate policies which tend to
illustrate the GDR as a new and viable nation in the
international milieu.
Policy Example: The attempt to convincingly downplay
Soviet penetration and control enhances GDR autonomy and
hence sovereignty.
3. Ideology goals are met by advocating the inherent
"rightness of the East German social and political
system.
Policy Example: The policy of controlled emigration
and limited contact would serve to protect ideological
foundations.
4. Social goals encompass all those policies which
are aimed at maintaining popular support through economic
growth, standard of living, welfare, etc.
Policy Example: official help in increasing reception
of West German television broadcasts in the Eastern
portions of the GDR illustrate social goal motivations.
Figure 4.6 GDR L/S Motivations in the Third World.
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run parallel. As long as these relations provide the SED with the benefits discussed
above, East German activity will continue in the developing world as another means to
build and maintain domestic legitimacy and stability.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
These six analyses of East German foreign policy demonstrate the importance of
legitimacy and stability concerns in overall foreign policy formulation by the SED
leadership. Although ultimately controlled by the Soviet Union, the GDR has acted in
its own national interests; more than once conflicting with those of the USSR.
The conflicts over detente, the policy of Abgrenzung, and "Damage Limitation"
(as seen through the L/S perspective) all provide possible understanding for the
Soviet-GDR-West German relationship as it exists even today. The actions taken by
the SED in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980-81 also illustrate the
importance of legitimacy /stabihty goals when closely examined. Lastly, East German
involvement in the Third World proves to be another means with which to reduce the




V. AMERICAN POLICIES AND THE GDR
A. INTRODUCTION
Given the nature of legitimacy and stability as a determinant of both domestic
and foreign policies of the SED regime, how does this relationship influence American
policy in the region? To answer this question, this chapter addresses American policies
in Germany (both East and West Germany). The national interest of the United States
as it applies to the GDR is analyzed in terms of its nature as well as its relationship to
the maintenance of East German legitimacy and stability goals. ^"^^
First, past American policies in Germany are discussed with emphasis on the
post-World War II period of the Cold War and the period of detente beginning in the
late 1960's; second, the relationship of American interests to the attainment of L/S
goals by the SED regime is portrayed and analyzed using a matrix derived from
Donald Neuchterlein's book, National Interest's and Presidential Leadership.
Lastly, future U.S. policy options vis-a-vis East Germany are explored.
B. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The mid to late 1940's were watershed years for East-West relations and the
German question as it emerged after the defeat of the Third Reich. During World War
II, the allies had determined to divide Germany into occupation zones for purposes of
administration and military' control after the war. In the immediate post-war period,
there seemed to be five possible solutions to the German problem: ^"^^
1. A so-called "Carthaginian Peace" was desired by broad segments of the
populations of the victorious nations. This entaile'cl outright annexation and
permanent Allied control of German territories, drastfc reparations and
dismantlement, and multinational control of the industrial Ruhr. This option
It must be emphasized that East Germany has acted as a "sub-set" of the
larger East European/Soviet problem for the United States and, therefore, must be
analyzed as such in this chanter. The unique nature of the CjDR, as well as the
consequent opportunities and constraints for the United States, are important --
however, important only as a part of the overall American eifort in its international
relations in tne region.
Donald Ncuchterlcin, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The
Setting of Priorities (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978).
From Klaus Epstein, "The Division of Germany." in The Origins of the Cold
War ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974), pp.
123-125.
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was predicated on continued cooperation between the Soviet Union and the
United States. Another drawback to this alternative was that it could never win
the support of the German people.
2. A second alternative could occur if the United States once again pulled out of
the international arena in a return to isolationism. The Soviet Union would be
allowed full rein in Germany, and the natural, as well as human, resources of
the late great power would become implements of the USSR.
3. Western domination of all of Germany was another possibility, but could only
be attained in an aggressive campaign of Western militarv superiority to impose
unfavorable terms ijpon the Russians. To attain this sup'eriority hovVcver, tnere
would have to occur total cooperation and commitment among" the three major
Western powers — given the condition of post-war Europe, an event extremely
unlikely to develop.
4. The fourth policy option in 1Q45 was the negotiation of a four-power agreement
on a completely "neutralized Germanv. intact and progressing toward autonomv
(as in the Austrian case in 1955). 'The growing hostility between the Soviet
Union and the United States, as well as differences in" civil, economic, and
political administration in the respective zones, proved this solution to be
unworkable.
5. The final alternative was the partition of Germany along zonal borders. To
accomplish this. American policmakers realized that the western zones would
have to be quickly rehabilitated and integrated into the Western European
community.
Initially, American policies were undertaken to promote cooperation with the
Soviets, reflecting a so-called "Left" view of solutions to the German problem (based
upon the "Carthaginian peace" alternative).^'^'* These policies proved detrimental to
American interests in Central Europe, hovvever, since American and British zones were
comprised of mainly industrial lands (and the French and Russians possessed
agricultural regions), food was required to be imported while reparations were extracted
for all Allies from these Anglo-American areas. In addition, Germany's war damage
was so extensive that there was little industrial base from which to exact reparations
without even greater destruction of the German economy. It rapidly became evident to
the Americans that this spelled economic ruin for Germany and instability for all of
Western Europe.
With this realization, American policy began to change. An important first step
in the process leading to the division of Germany began in September 1946 when
Secretary of State James Byrnes announced the creation of Bizonia (an economic
fusion of the British and American zones). This reflected the increasing tensions with
The "Left" consisted of those who believed themselves to be carrying out the
mission .on which the L'nited States had embarked in World War II. It targeted for
eliniination militarism, Junkerism, big capital, and^ naturally, Nazism. Conversely, the
"Right" desired to utilize Germany irfthe light against Russia and communism.
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the Soviets. ^'^ A relationship with the Russians had evolved where:
Too many difTerences separated the two sides for them to work together on a
matter so centrally important as Germany; even when they used the s'ame words,
they could not understand each other. A division into two Germanvs would be
preferable to a struggle for the, soul of a united Germany, a contest that might
well end in a third world war.
Throughout the spring of 1947, continued Russian intransigence caused a virtual
standstill in negotiations over Germany's fate and further aroused American suspicions
over Soviet intentions in Europe. From then on the evolution of the West German
state and its integration into the Western bloc became the sine qua non for American
policies in Europe. Shortly thereafter the Truman Doctrine was announced and in
June, the three western zones were invited into the Marshall Plan.^'^^ Then, in July, the
famous Mr. X article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", was published in Foreign
Affairs, creating in the process an international sensation. All three of these
important events outlined the beginning of an American policy of "containment" in
regards to communism, and the future of Germany was inextricably linked to this
foreign policy orientation.
This announcement came after a Council of Foreign Minister's meeting in
Paris during April and in June and July 1946; where Secretary Bvrnes proposed a





the "inadequacy" of the plan and
demanded the "democratization" of Germanv (in the Soviet sense of the word). Me
also reiterated the demand for SIO billion dollars in reparations and the creation of
four-power control of the industrially rich Ruhr valley. This served to widen the rill
between the two new superpowers. " Sec Mans W. Gatzke,. Germany and ihe United
Slates: A Special Relationship! (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp.
lo /- 1 Jo.
Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National
Security State (Boston: Iloughton MillhnCompariy, 19/8), p. 230.
This plan was to aid in the recovery of Europe, and was motivated to keep
communism from occurring in the war-ravaged territories bv the infusion of American
money. It embodied the essence of the Truman Doctrine (which had been triccered bv
events in Greece and Turkey). The Marshall plan also proved to be an^rmmense
success in both rebuilding the European economies and preventing instabilitv in
Western Europe (and hence opportunities for comiiiunism to take hold). One author
stated, "The Marshall Plan had been a massive success, and at a cost that represented
only a tiny fraction of the U.S. national jncome over the same four-year period and
was smaller than America's liquor bill for these same years!" See' John Snanier,
American Foreign Policy Since World War II, sixth edition (New York: Praeser
Publishers, 1975), p. 53. .
"
The author was actually George Kennan, the Foreign Service's foremost
expert on the Soviet Union. The article spelled out the communist outlook of world
affairs; defining Soviet interests in terms of the inevitable overthrow of the capitalist
West, and identified the necessity for the United States to counter this hegemonic
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Thus, the United States entered into a new era in its foreign policy. Although
there appeared to be a tendency to return to the traditional isolationalist posture of the
past (massive demobilization after the war was a good indicator of this), Soviet
intransigence, aggression, and actions in Eastern Europe began to affect both public
and leadership attitudes toward the USSR. The Americans reluctantly recognized that
they were now the leading . nation in the world and, as the old colonial empires
crumbled, the traditional European powers could no longer maintain the balance of
power as before. The future of Germany emerged at the center of the struggle between
the two new superpowers in the world, and by 1947 policymakers realized that the
United States was faced with two overriding goals -- to counter Soviet subversion
against a poverty-stricken and war-ravaged Europe and to restore some balance of
power against the USSR (while satisfying France that Germany would not again
threaten her).
From 1947 to 1949, events moved rapidly as both East and West consolidated
their positions in Germany, and these years would prove to be the most decisive in the
histor>' of postwar Germany. The French became the target of American and British
diplomacy to allay French fears of a revitalized Germany, and the February 1948
Czechoslovakian coup served as a further stimulus for Western Europeans and the
Americans to begin seriously working on an acceptable formula for the Western zones
to be merged into a trizonal arrangement (which occurred in 1949). Currency reforms
were undertaken to spur economic recovery in these zones; the first international
confrontation over Berlin occurred; NATO was created as a Western alliance with
twelve signatories in April 1949; and in May, the constitution of the new Federal
Republic of Germany was adopted at a time when elections were occurring in East
Germany to establish the GDR.
By May 1949, the Americans had thus convinced the French that U.S. presence
in Europe would prevent future German domination of the Alliance and the division of
Germany had been rendered "permanent." In addition, NATO provided the means to
begin the integration of West Germany into Western Europe to counter Soviet
influence; a divided Germany in the Western sphere of influence was indeed better than
a united Germany under the control of the USSR. The next few years were devoted to
power. Kennan had also authored the "Long Telegram" in 1946 as chief of mission in
the American Embassy in Moscow, probablv the most famous telegram sent within the




preparing the FRG to take greater part in the Alliance and become a major player in
Western Europe.
During this period, American policy toward Germany, as has been briefly
described here, was in large measure determined by Soviet actions; however, there were
other interests involved as well. The United States had concerns for national security,
the maintenance of free enterprise, and possible desires for economic gain in the
rehabilitation of a free Germany and a viable and democratic Western Europe. All of
these interests revolved around the support of a new Germany — West Germany.
Subsequent U.S. policies toward the GDR during the 1950's were based upon
containment of Communism and support for the Federal Republic of Germany.
Consequently, a position of total non-recognition of East German sovereignty was
embodied in America's participation inthe Hallstein Doctrine. ^'^^ The absence of East
German legitimacy (as perceived by the United States) was reinforced by the Soviet
interventions during the labor riots in June 1953 and the two Berlin crises (1948 and
1961).^ In addition, the movement of hundreds of thousands of East German emigres
to the West before the construction of the Berlin Wall illustrated the lack of indigenous
support for the regime during this time.
•Therefore, American policies were forced to consider the reaUties of the German
situation in the areas of human rights, political freedom, and the totalitarian aspects of
Marxism in the GDR. At the same time, however, the primary interest of the United
States clearly entailed the maintenance of stability in Central Europe through
preserving the balance of power/status quo and containing the Soviets. Consequently,
support for the West German position was a major factor in official American
positions on reunification, although a unified Germany might not have been a logical
goal of U.S. policies. '^^
As mentioned earlier, this policv served to punish those countries which
recognized or interacted in any positive way towards the GDR. See Chapter IV.
For an. excellent analysis of the Berlin crises and related American policies, see
Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis (London: George Allen and^Unwin, 1982).
^^^Although U.S. policies, for obvious reasons outwardly supported
reunification, it is illogical to believe that American policymakers trulv de'sircd to bring
back a destabilizing power such as a new and restored Germany under the currem
circumstances.
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After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, both the United States and the Soviet
Union seemed open to East-West dialogue - dialogue including the German question.
By 1967, the United States perceived advantages in normalizing relations with Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. First of all, and possibly most importantly, world
tensions could be relaxed in an atmosphere of increased negotiations; detente could
prove extremely beneficial for the U.S. when viewed in the context of Vietnam, costs of
maintaining troops all' over the world, and, above all, the attainment of nuclear parity
with the United States by the Soviets. Second, detente could assure America of future
political, economic, ideological, and cultural influence in the region. Third, closer
contacts could possibly loosen the ties of the Eastern European nations from the
Kremlin and encourage liberalization within the Eastern European regimes. Fourth,
better relations with the Soviet bloc could enable greater trade with these countries.
These motivations taken together were not always compatible and hence created
dilemmas for American policymaking in the region. The Johnson and Nixon
administrations desired a general lessening of tensions with the Soviets, yet were
constrained by conflicting interests. Alan Jones summarizes the problems facing the
United States in the attempt at opening dialogue with the East:
Characteristically, however, the American problem was one of balancing policv
initiatives in diflerent directions. Under some circumstances diplomatic overture's
in. Eastern . Europe could well prove dangerous and counterproductive. The
Nixon administration was hard-pressed to balance its regional and its worldwide
interests. At one end of the policv spectrum, improvement in relations with
Eastern Europe could not be allowed, bv arousing Soviet suspicions, to
icopardize other American interests, above all a more "general detente with the
Soviet Union that could lead to major nuclear disarmament and lessen the danger
of global conflicts; at the other end, the structure of American alliances could not
be Rashly compromised against the contmgency of a Soviet "change of heart," a
stifiening of the Kremlin's" world policy.
This "balancing act" became even more precarious for a short time as Willy
Brandt's Osipolitik expanded and seemed to outrun y\merican interests in the region, as
well as the world per se. In the final analysis, however, Osipolitik enabled increased
opportunities for the United States to arrange a rapprochement with the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. The Soviet-West German nonaggression treaty signed in August
1970 paved the way for a non-belligerent stance toward the ERG by the Soviets (the
first time since the creation of West Germany), and opened new forums in which the
^^^Alan M. Jones, Jr., U.S. Foreiqn Policy In a Chancing World (New York:
Davis McKay Company, Inc., 1974), p. 129.
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United States could work towards detente. The numerous treaties and agreements
signed in the following years all contributed to the recognition of both sides of the
post-World War II status quo. Thus the process of detente was furthered by the
actions of Brandt's government, and the treaties and conferences which followed
allowed the superpowers to negotiate a number of important issues concerning
.post-World War II settlements, arms limitations, and human rights. ^^^
American policies during detente were based upon cooperation with the East
without directly threatening the legitimacy of the communist institutions or
undermining their authority. The status quo was the centerpiece of policy, and
recognition of Soviet influence, postwar borders, and the German Democratic Republic
became paramount in the negotiations. As a result, between 1968 and 1975 American
policy toward the East succeeded in increasing mutual contacts — economic, cultural,
and political.
In the case of East Germany, the United States was forced to recognize the fact
that there was another German nation, thereby emphasizing world order interests
above idealistic desires for a free and democratic East Germany and, by doing so,
enhancing the chances of success in the negotiations with the Soviets. Detente,
therefore, illustrates the American inclination towards stability and world order in
Central Europe. For example, even after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968, the process of detente and Ostpolitik continued almost without interruption,
and, in reality, provided impetus for increased negotiations.
American policies continued into the late 1970's based upon detente with the
Soviet Union. The Carter administration in the last half of the decade succeeded in
negotiating SALT II and emphasized the human rights aspects of previous treaties and
agreements; however, by the end of the decade detente was in decline as the Soviets
and their proxies became involved in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Vietnam,
Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. By 1979, it seemed that detente was in decline.
Some of the more important negotiations which followed were: (1) the West
German-Polish treatv recocnizins the Oder-Neisse border as the permanent Polish
frontier siened in 1970- (2) tlic 1971 four-power agreement on the status of. and access
to, West T3crlin signed by the United States^ Finance, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Union; (3) the Baste Treaty between the two Germanies which was signed in .December
1972. This provided for mutual recocnition, respect of each other's^ sovereigntv, and
the development of normal and peaceful relations; (4) the beginning of the Conference
on European Security and Cooperation in November 1972 TCSCE). This conference
brought together 32 major players from within and without the WTO and NA'I O, and
resulted in the Helsinki Final Accords in 1975, including the so-called Basket 3 on
human rights; and (5) the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) in 1972.
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With the advent of the 1980's and the Reagan administration, the policy of
"difTerentiation" has been emphasized.^ This poUcy derives from the notion that
Eastern Europe is something other than a monolith. The United States' bilateral
relations with East Germany, as with other Eastern European nations, are based upon
its unique and different situation (hence differentiation). Foreign policy behavior
which exhibits some autonomy from the USSR and seems to parallel Western interests
is more apt to be rewarded. In addition, any liberalization of the economy, culture,
political structure, emigration, or human rights is also prone to receive favorable
responses from the United States, such as the granting of most-favored nation
treatment and export credits and guarantees. Although differentiation dates back to
the 1940's, the Reagan Administration has reconfirmed the overall nature of past
American policies in this regard.
US-GDR relations have gradually improved in the past few years with a number
of important and unprecedented exchanges and visits. ^^^ The Reagan Administration's
greater interest in the GDR reflects a recognition of the growing importance of East
Germany in the Soviet bloc. However, American policies toward the FRG have not
been ignored in this increased awareness of the GDR.
Specifically, President Reagan's policy has shown itself to consist of three main
features: (1) no recognition of a lawful division of Europe and Germany; (2) acceptance
and recognition of Eastern European diversity (and hence GDR uniqueness); and (3)
encouragement of peaceful changes in political and social areas. These policy goals
have aimed at evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. The administration has
set certain conditions for improving relations with the SED regime (as with other
countries):
Evidence of reciprocity. Individual countries must have the desire and ability to
reciprocate in our relations and show sensitivity to U.S. interests.
Indications of a constructive policy in Europe, through the CSCE process and in
bilateral relations with other European countries . . . 7
^
^'^"DifTerentiation" actually began in the 1940's, however, the Reagan
Administration has standardized it, given it a name, and adopted it as its own.
Ronald D. Asmus, "The Schultz Visit To Eastern Europe " Radio Free Europe
Research (I^D Backsround Rcport/4 9 Januarv 1986), pp. 4-.y. Related issues which
have been discussed" during the 1980's include those dealing with settlement of
American war claims.
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Indications that individual governments are sensitive to the traditions and
aspirations of their people ....
Willingness bv eovernments to fulfill their obligations under human rights,
economic, and" other provisions of the CSCE Final Act.
Rhetorically, the Administration continues to attempt to separate East Germany
from the Soviets as seen in December 19S5 vv'hen Secretary of State George Schultz
visited several Soviet bloc countries and stated:
. . . the division of Berlin, Germany, and Europe was "unnatural and inhumane"
and that the United States did not recognize the incorporatiqn^of East Berlin, the
GDR, or Eastern Europe into the Soviet sphere of influence.
In summary, throughout the last 41 years, the United States has been forced to
deal with the German question and the dilemmas it creates. American policies have
been, for the most part, reactive to the Soviets and supportive oC the West Germans.
As the American national interests have been perceived to benefit from a change of
policy such as occurred in the late 1960's and early 1970's, new and flexible policies
have been implemented with the help of Western European allies, especially West
Germany. Today, it is very diflTicult to analyze the policies of the United States in
terms of just the GDR; all of Eastern Europe is involved in American policymaking.
East Germany does, however, provide unique aspects and opportunities for American
influence in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as will be demonstrated in the next
section.
C. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND GDR L/S GOALS
In writing of U.S. policies in Eastern Europe, Bennett Kovrig states:
The hi:>torical experience of the United States in its dealings with East Central
Europe is one of disappointed idealism and modcstlv rewarded pragmatism.
Olflcial policy has vacillated between activism and bcnig'n neglect, but at its core
one finds the constant faclor of revisionism -- oI~ dissatisfaction with the political
status quo of the region.
U.S. Consress Joint Economic Committee, East European Economics: Slow
Growth in the IQSCs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oflicc, 28 October
1985), p. 559.
Ronald D. Asmus, "The Schultz Visit to Eastern Europe," p. 5.
Bennett Kovrig, "The United States: 'Peaceful Engagement' Revisited," in The
International Politics of Eastern Europe, ed. Charles "Gati (New York: Praegcr
Publishers, 1976), p. 131.
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This niix of idealism and pragmatism is extremely evidem in U.S. policies in the GDR,
and it contributes to the dilemma of, on the one hand, addressing idealistic national
interests, while on the other, maintaining world order interests involved there.
The postwar division of Germany has forced the United States to confront a
status quo it cannot idealistically condone or realistically change. The importance of
the GDR to the USSR, including many Soviet "vital" national interests, creates a
stalemate. To accomplish even limited goals, the United States must operate with this
in mind. This, in turn, forces a tacit acceptance of the existing regime in East
Germany and the realization that a stable regime may be more useful in pursuing
American interests. Therefore, maintenance of a stable East Germany contributes to a
stable Central Europe.
The national interests of the United States in East Germany can be demonstrated
by placing them in a matrix which relates them to the four legitimacy/stability goals of
the GDR. U.S. "interest" categories consist of economic interests, ideological interests,
and world order interests:
1. Economic Interests- These include those which involve any commercial or
financial links which aflcct American foreign trade and commerce.
2. Ideological Interests- These interests encompass all of those ideals and values
which the United States (as a political culture) would prefer to occur in the
GDR, to include individual Irecdom, democracv, free enterprise,, etc. jn
addition, these regional goals contribute to the larger aim of containing Soviet
communism.
3. World Order Interests- The maintenance of a stable and secure international
environment in Central Europe is the main oE\entation of these national
interests (consequently enhancing world stability).
In this context, how does the American national interest matrix relate to the four East
German legitimacy/stability goals introduced in the last chapter? Figure 5.1 illustrates
this relationship. The related U.S. national interest is identified as either positively or
negatively influenced in the continued maintenance of the particular East German goal.
1. GDR National Identity Goals- The United States supports West German efTorts
at keeping the inter-German relationship open. 'I his serves to prevent an
eyolution of a separate East German national identity anions its people which,
if realized, could harm American ideolocical interests 5y dcstroving the
traditional cultural links with the FRG. Mo'wcver, world order interests would
be positivelv alfected if the growth of an East German socio-political identitv
continues; because this nationalism would render permanent the division. oT
Germany ;- a situation which serves American coals for regional stability.
Economic interests in this aspect are not important factors.
Neuchterlein's "defense interests" have been subsumed into this category















+ Positively influenced by continued L/S maintenance
- Negatively influenced by continued L/S maintenance
Figure 5.1 U.S. Interests in GDR L/S Goals.
2. GDR Sovereignty Goals- Continued diplomatic recognition and relations with
the. GDR strengthens American leverage over some aspects of East German
actions and provides assistance in aiding in West German demands. Since this
recognition serves to legitimize the SED regime, it contributes to the
maintenance of both East German stability andlhe current status quo of the
East-West confrontation in Central Europe. This contributes to American
world order interests, but detracts from American ideological
.
interests.
Economic interests now become involved because diplomatic recognition allows
greater economic interaction and creates opportunities for increasing East
German dependence on trade and technology from America and the West.
Consequently, this allows some American influence in GDR domestic policies
(although indirectly).
3. GDR Ideology Goals- American ideological interests are definitely not served by
contributing to the maintenance of a Marxist-Leninist society in the GDR.
However, world order interests arc positively affected through the stability
which results from the assurance that the Soviets will not acti\^ly intervene to
stop any "counterrevolution" in East Germany.
4. GDR Social Goals- East German attempts at increasing the standards of living
and meeting the needs of its citizens is a very important means for gaininS
support, as discussed in the chapter on domestic implements of legitimacy and
stability. This. goal influences all three American national interests'. Economic
interests are important because the United States can use financial and
commercial "carrots" in the form of increased loans, western technology, or
market access to alTect desirable changes within both the domestic and foreign
poUcy of East Germany (from the American perspective). This consequently
enables a limited avenue to exert inlluence for resolving idealistic concerns oT
the United States, especially in the area of human rights. Lastly, world order
interests are maintained because of the increased security and sta'bilitv which is
created for the East Germans through the growth of the" standard of living and
hence popular support; East German stability does not threaten Soviet interests,
thus providing no motivations for increased Soviet activity in the region.
This rather simplistic analysis of the American interests in the maintenance of
East German legitimacy today illustrates the importance of pragmatism in the final
99
development of U.S. foreign policy. The matrix shows that the American interests are
"prioritized" and in the East German case, world order and security appear to be
greater determinants of U.S. policy than are idealistic concerns. However, the matrix
also provides a glimpse of the "tight rope" on which American foreign policy often
treads; for, as the world order interests are pursued, the idealistic interests are not
forgotten. This demonstrates the distinctive nature of the American pursuit of the
ever-present compromise between the ideals of the political culture of the United States
and the problematic context in U.S foreign policy.
D. U.S. POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE
In developing future policies concerning the German Democratic Republic, there
are three things which affect all decisions in this regard: (1) the nature of overall
East-West relations; (2) the political posture of America's European allies (especially
West Germany); and (3) the internal development of the GDR itself Since the United
States' interests in the GDR are relative to other countries in Eastern and Central
Europe, the status of the above factors will always contribute to current policy. Any
American administration cannot interact with East Germany (or any other communist
country) in a vacuum.
Given the importance to the United States of stability in Central Europe and the
desire for liberalization of the communist countries there, what are the policy options
available to the U.S.? First of all, any attempts to directly challenge Soviet power and
influence in solving the German question could only produce a high risk of nuclear
war, and overt disruptions of East German stability could possibly bring even greater
Soviet intervention and penetration of GDR society. Since this paper has shown the
importance of legitimacy to regime stability in East Germany, the United States must
adopt policies which do not drastically damage the regime's legitimacy. Therefore,
limited objectives contributing to long-range goals must be formulated.
Between absolute neglect on the one extreme and armed intervention on the








Hostile Separation- This policy entails a complete pull-back from East Germany by the
United States and, if possible, her allies (in all aspects -- politically, economically, and
socially). This would place the full burden of the continued viability of East Germany
on the Russians and reduce Western aid to the country. The aim of this policy would
be to force the Soviets to reconsider their position there and, theoretically, make them
more amenable to change for Western concessions; however, this policy would require
the United States to give up what influence it now has in East Germany, an influence
which has been gained slowly over a long period of time. In addition, the United
States would be forced to "rehve" the past as under the Hallstein Doctrine. The
importance of East Germany to the ERG would make this policy all but impossible to
successfully carry out without alienating West Germany.
Peaceful Intervention- This involves Western actions inside the country through
propaganda, economic pressure, and diplomatic pressure to create tension in order to
drain Soviet and SED resources in maintaining stability. A policy such as this would
also make life for the people very uncomfortable and, at least, create instability and
thus foster greater Soviet/SED control and repression.
Aggressive Differentiation- As in differentiation, this policy would concentrate on
treating the GDR in a unique way; however, in this case, the primary' purpose would
be to create schisms between the SED and the Soviet Union through "carrot and stick"
approaches without regard to stability concerns within the region. A degree of unrest,
instability, and tension are viewed in this policy to be advantageous to the U.S.
Because of the level of Soviet military presence in the country and the nature of the
relationship between the SED and the CPSU, the chances for success would be
extremely low, and the chances for a dangerous military confrontation would be high
(on the whole, very disadvantageous).
Accommodation- Policies of modest and normal relations with the SED on all levels
aimed toward maintenance of the status quo and regional stability could encourage the
East Germans to feel more secure and improve their foreign relations posture towards
the West. Economic and diplomatic relations would not be promoted or discouraged,
but left alone to evolve naturally. The disadvantages of this policy include the
unpalatable requirement for the West to accept the current situation in Eastern Europe
in order to foster stability. It would also spell the complete abandonment of any
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pretext to the future reunification of Germany, creating at the same time possible
tensions within NATO (especially concerning the FRG).
Benign Aggression- This would entail a policy to address the humanitarian aspects of
the present division of Germany. Emphasis would be placed on increases in visitation
privileges, consumer-oriented trade, cultural exchanges, and sustained Western
influence without challenging the status quo. Although Western influence could still
affect the Soviet and SED hold on the country, any gains would be far outweighed by
losses in the moral and political positions given up if this were implemented. It would
require the West to accept more formally the unfavorable situation in Germany.
Gradual Liberalization- Another name for differentiation, this is the policy which the
U.S. has pursued since the 1940's (as described earlier). The goal has always been to
affect change in Eastern Europe (and East Germany) by providing favorable treatment
to countries showing independence from Moscow without causing destabilization in the
region.
If world order interests are paramount in Central Europe for the United States
(as demonstrated in the matrix), and the stability of the GDR depends upon legitimacy
and maintenance of the division of Germany, then a continuation of the policy of
differentiation seems to be the correct way to attain U.S. long-range goals in the
region. This policy stance provides the capability to address all three American
national interests in Central Europe without causing tensions within NATO (the
current situation withstanding). In the future, however, the United States must try to
take advantage of the discord between Moscow and Berlin to reinforce behavior
favorable to the West. Not only must the regime be the target of Western
reinforcement, whether negative or positive, but the East German people must continue
to be an important focus for Western propaganda and hence influence. In addition.
Western credibility as perceived by the population of the GDR must be pursued. To
better accomplish this, greater consultation and cooperation between the Western.
Allies is needed to limit disagreement over unilateral actions and prevent ill-feelings
over policy outcomes.
Due to the constraints facing the United States when dealing with the GDR (i.e.,
ideology interests vs. world order interests), a modest and gradual approach to the
liberalization of East Germany is required. Any instability within the GDR only
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increases the chances for greater internal suppression and Soviet penetration. The
United States must recognize the importance of legitimacy and stability to the SED
regime and formulate policies accordingly. If world order is maintained, American
policymakers can pursue second order interests through less threatening means and, in
the process, attain long-term results. Just as the GDR must formulate policies within
the spectrum of Soviet control, the United States must formulate her policies towards
Central Europe with the East German quest for legitimacy and stability always in
mind. Any irreparable damage to these vital interests of the SED regime could ver>'
well topple the deUcate relationship which has evolved in Central Europe. The United




The Socialist Unity Party's search for regime legitimacy and stability is a product
of East Germany's unique situation in Central Europe, and the nature of the GDR's
creation has forced the regime to continue to strive for these goals. Although East
Germany shares common characteristics with other communist nations in the Warsaw-
Pact, its credibility dilemma contains two different obstacles to overcome; as Roland
Smith writes:
Whereas in the other countries, the problem concerns only the form of the state
and not its national identity, in the GDR the two questions ane^, linked
inseparably because the state justifies its existence by its socialist nature.
As a result, the SED's legitimacy and stability concerns are the driving factors in
domestic and foreign policies. Domestically, these concerns are addressed through
various policies which affect East German citizens from early childhood until death.
The importance of economics in realizing legitimacy/stability goals will continue as a
tool in legitimizing the regime and act as the primary measure of success (as perceived
by the population as well as its leaders). In foreign affairs, regime concerns for
maintaining stability (through legitimacy) are also determinants of policy as seen in the
GDR's relationships with the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, West Germany, and the
Third World.
Those instances where discord has arisen between the Soviet Union and East
Germany over inter-German relations derive from the East German paranoic need to
attain legitimacy. Relations with the FRG can almost exclusively be viewed in this
context. Today, East Berlin's position on the inter-German relationship reflects East
German anxieties, namely: recognition of separate GDR citizenship, the mutual
exchange of ambassadors, abolishment of human rights monitoring, and the settlement
of the Elbe river border contentions.'^^ The quest continues even into the SDI debate
Roland Smith, "Soviet Policv Toward West Germany," Adelphi Papers,
Number 203 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1985),
p. 6.
'^'Thesc four points are part of the so-called Gera demands stated by Ilonccker
in a speech in October 1980.
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which has replaced INF as the major East-West issue, and the SED leadership is facing
similar policy dilemmas this time around.
Relations with other Soviet bloc countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland,
fall in line with the legitimacy and stability concerns of the East German regime. This
was demonstrated by the policies carried out by the GDR in 1968 and again in
1980-81. By analyzing the different goals which were pursued in these crises a basis for
understanding East German decisionmaking becomes apparent. The East German
involvement in the Third World demonstrates another means to build legitimacy and
stability. Mihtary, economic, and diplomatic ties with developing countries aids in
attaining those legitimacy/stability goals outlined in this paper. Given the importance
of these four goals to the SED regime, the traditional East German search for stability
and legitimacy will continue to govern what independent foreign policy the GDR carries
out in the future.
The circumstances leading to the creation of the GDR; its character; and its
relationships create a complex situation for American policymakers. The conflict
between U.S. ideological and strategic goals in the region are not easily resolved. The
current policy of striking a balance of ideological and national security (world order)
interests appears to be the most prudent, although greater care should be taken to
identify future opportunities. The recognition of constraints on American power and
influence in East Germany; the continued utilization of trade influence; support for
inter-German relations; and restraint of policies which could destabilize the poUtical
structure of the GDR, all seem to contribute to a flexible and realistic approach. For
the United States, the importance of legitimacy and stability to the GDR leadership
provides a means to understand their motivations as well as a possible avenue to affect
change, albeit subtly. The East German case illustrates the uniqueness of both states'
national interests - the GDR's reliance on a narrow set of goals and the United States'
need to resolve seemingly incompatible objectives in a vitally important region.
The tremendous scope of internal and external policies created to build and
consolidate legitimacy and stability in East Germany are implications of important
political phenomena - phenomena worth studying. As long as there remains two
Germanics with two different sociopolitical systems, drastically influenced by the two
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